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BET ON THE FIELD: WHY FIELD PREEMPTION SHOULD
APPLY TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
JACK MILLIGAN*
ABSTRACT
One of the primary challenges facing the American aviation
industry is the issue of federal preemption. Although Congress
has a long history of heavy involvement in regulating the avia-
tion industry, the Federal Aviation Act (FAAct) does not include
an express preemption provision, leaving states, courts, and in-
dustry members with little guidance about the proper reach of
federal and state regulations. The circuit courts are sharply di-
vided on their approaches and answers to this question. The is-
sue of preemption is especially important in the context of
aviation manufacturing, where the federal government has pre-
scribed a litany of different safety standards, but state law prod-
uct liability claims continue to be governed by state law
standards of care. Manufacturers are therefore subjected to a
variety of potential requirements across each state, which is
problematic for a number of reasons.
Exacerbating the issue, the Supreme Court recently declined
to hear two cases regarding FAAct preemption, each from a dif-
ferent side of the circuit split. Until this split is resolved, in the
interest of uniformity and certainty, undecided circuits should
adopt the Second Circuit’s field preemption approach and re-
ject the Third Circuit’s conflict preemption approach. Field pre-
emption is more consistent with both the intended purpose of
the FAAct and the unique nature of the aviation industry.
This Comment will analyze the differing approaches taken by
the circuit courts and will make the argument that the federal
design regulations establish a standard of care which should be
integrated into various state law claims. Uniformity is necessary
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2021. B.S., Economics, Texas
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for the aviation industry given its interconnection with interstate
commerce and will provide clarity for both manufacturers and
courts. Finally, this Comment will explain why and how other
circuit courts should adopt the field preemption approach while
awaiting Supreme Court guidance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE AVIATION INDUSTRY IS a vital sector of interstatecommerce in America, transporting millions of people and
products across the country every day. Although inherently na-
tional in scale, the industry is still subject to a variety of state laws
and regulations, particularly within the field of aviation safety.
Circuit courts are currently split on the issue of whether the Fed-
eral Aviation Act (FAAct) preempts only conflicting state laws or
the entire field of aviation safety.1 While the Third Circuit ap-
plied principles of conflict preemption to the FAAct, the Second
Circuit held that the FAAct preempts the entire field of state
aviation safety.2 The Supreme Court has declined to hear either
case,3 adding further uncertainty to the aviation industry. The
Court will likely resolve the issue within the near future, but in
the meantime, other circuits must choose between the two com-
peting approaches to FAAct preemption. Because the Second
Circuit’s decision in Tweed allows for a uniform federal standard
of care for aircraft manufacturers, other circuits should follow
suit and hold that the FAAct impliedly preempts the entire field
1 Compare Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 708–09 (3d Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 495 (2016) (limiting the FAA rules application), with
Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 2508 (2020) (finding the FAA’s detemination overruled state
law).
2 See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 708–9; Tweed, 930 F.3d at 75.
3 Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth., 140 S. Ct. 2508; Sikkelee, 137 S. Ct. 495.
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of aviation safety. This Comment will begin by explaining the
historical background of both federal aviation regulation and
preemption law in Part II. Next, Part III discusses the current
state of federal preemption law with respect to the FAAct and its
amendments and analyzes the circuit split over the FAAct’s pre-
emption powers. Part IV begins by explaining why the FAAct
should be interpreted to preempt the entire field of aviation
safety and concludes by explaining how other circuit courts
should incorporate Tweed into their own preemption analyses.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATION
The federal government’s history of aviation regulation began
in 1926 with the passage of the Air Commerce Act.4 This legisla-
tion gave the Department of Commerce oversight over (1) air
commerce; (2) issuance and enforcement of traffic rules; (3)
licensing and certification; and (4) airway control.5 Over the
next decade, as air travel became more prevalent, it became
clear that the federal government needed to exercise more con-
trol over aviation safety.6
In 1938, President Roosevelt signed the Civil Aeronautics Act,
which established both the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA)
and later the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).7 The CAA was re-
sponsible for air traffic control, certifications, safety enforce-
ment, and airway development—making it the predecessor of
the modern Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).8 The Sec-
ond World War ushered in significant improvements in aviation
technology, such as jet engines, making aviation safety even
more of a pressing concern for the federal government.9 Al-
though air traffic had more than doubled in the decade follow-
4 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
5 Id. §§ 2–3, 5.
6 A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2017), https://
www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/ [https://perma.cc/W4AV-PKWN]. In-
terestingly, the death of legendary Notre Dame football coach Knute Rockne was
one of the primary catalysts for the sweeping changes made in the aviation safety
field. Id. Rockne was killed in a plane crash in 1931, and the resulting public
outcry prompted the federal government to take its oversight of aviation more
seriously. Id.
7 Id.; see 49 U.S.C. § 1131. CAB was the predecessor to the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board and was largely responsible for accident investigation, admin-
istrative rulings, and economic regulation. A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 6.
8 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 6.
9 Id.
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ing World War II, “little had been done to mitigate the risk of
midair collisions.”10
The Federal Aviation Agency (FAAgency) was established in
1958 with the passage of the FAAct.11 In creating the FAAgency,
Congress stated that its intention was “to create a Federal Avia-
tion Agency, to provide for the regulation and promotion of
civil aviation in such manner as to best foster its development
and safety, and to provide for the safe and efficient use of the
airspace by both civil and military aircraft.”12 In a later amend-
ment, the FAAgency was also given “exclusive sovereignty of air-
space of the United States.”13 As the Second Circuit noted
several years into the FAAgency’s existence, the agency’s pur-
pose was to “centraliz[e] in a single authority—indeed, in one
administrator—the power to frame rules for the safe and effi-
cient use of the nation’s airspace.”14 The FAAgency was trans-
ferred to the newly created Department of Transportation
(DoT) in 1966, and was renamed the FAA.15 Its role has only
expanded since then, and today, the FAA is responsible for
many aspects of aviation safety.16 Among other duties, the FAA
currently oversees aircraft licensing and certification; airport
regulations; air traffic control; aircraft noise control and other
environmental programs; commercial space regulation; aviation
research; and the testing and training of personnel across the
industry.17
For the purposes of this Comment, it is necessary to explain
the FAA’s regulatory control over aircraft manufactures. Under
the FAAct, aircraft manufacturers must first obtain three certifi-
cates: a type certificate,18 a production certificate,19 and an air-
worthiness certificate.20 The type certificate certifies that the
design of an aircraft or its parts performs properly and meets
the safety standards defined in FAA regulations.21 The FAA has a
baseline standard for certification for each type of product,
10 Id.
11 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
12 Id. pmbl.
13 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1).
14 Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 894 (2d Cir. 1960).
15 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 6.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.11–.55 (2020).
19 Id. §§ 21.131–.150.
20 Id. §§ 21.171–.199; 49 U.S.C. §§ 44704(d), 44711(a)(1).
21 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a); 14 C.F.R. § 21.31.
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which designates all of the regulations and safety standards re-
quired to receive the type certification—essentially a standard of
care for manufacturers.22 Once a manufacturer has received a
type certificate for an aircraft or component, it must receive a
production certificate, certifying that a duplicate of the aircraft
or part will conform to the design certified in the type certifi-
cate.23 Finally, the FAA issues an airworthiness certificate for
each aircraft, which certifies that the aircraft conforms to its de-
sign and is safe for flight.24
The FAA also maintains regulatory control over the safety of
an aircraft for the duration of its operational life, which is ac-
complished primarily in three ways. First, the FAA regulates the
training and certification of mechanics and other maintenance
personnel.25 Second, manufacturers who have been issued a
type certificate cannot deviate from the certified design without
FAA approval.26 Third, if the FAA becomes aware of an unsafe
condition on a previously certified aircraft, it may correct the
problem by issuing an “airworthiness directive,” which manufac-
turers must comply with.27
B. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The doctrine of preemption allows Congress to avoid conflicts
between federal and state laws and is a vital part of ensuring that
the federal system runs smoothly. Preemption is widely assumed
to be rooted in the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the Consti-
tution, although this assumption has been disputed.28 Though
written about less frequently than other constitutional law top-
ics, it is perhaps the most commonly used constitutional law doc-
22 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.16–.17.
23 Id. §§ 21.131–.150.
24 Id. § 21.183.
25 Id. § 65.81.
26 Id. §§ 21.91–.101.
27 Id. § 39.5.
28 U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2; see also Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemp-
tion, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768 (1994).
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2. Gardbaum argues that preemption is not a product of
the Supremacy Clause, but rather a means of effectuating Congress’s enumerated
powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Gardbaum, supra, at 781–82.
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trine in practice.29 Congress can preempt state laws either
expressly or implicitly by indicating its intent to occupy a given
field to the exclusion of state or local laws, which is known as
field preemption.30 Such intent can be inferred when the perva-
siveness of federal regulation precludes additional regulation by
the states, when the federal government’s interest in the field is
sufficiently dominant, or when the objective of federal regula-
tion aligns with the character of the obligations it imposes.31
The Constitution’s Tenth Amendment creates a presumption
against preemption in areas of the law which states have tradi-
tionally occupied, and in the absence of a clear and manifest
intent to occupy an entire field of the law, the Supreme Court
has stated that state police powers should not be superseded by
federal law.32 Even absent a showing of intent, Congress can pre-
empt state laws which conflict with federal law, either by making
it impossible to comply with both laws or by creating an obstacle
to the accomplishment of a congressional objective.33 Unsurpris-
ingly, congressional intent is the cornerstone of any preemption
analysis, and preemption cases often involve intense scrutiny of
the legislative history behind the statute in question.34 Courts
will also look at the language, structure, and purpose of a statute
or regulation in order to develop an understanding of Con-
gress’s intent.35
The FAAct employs both express and implied preemption.
For example, Section 41713 states,
Except [for certain Alaskan intrastate air transportation], a State,
political subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2
States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provi-
sion having the force and effect of law related to a price, route,
or service of any air carrier that may provide air transportation
under this [subchapter IV].36
The General Aviation Revitalization Act, codified in an official
note to the Federal Aviation Act, provides for an eighteen-year
statute of repose for product liability claims against aircraft and
29 Gardbaum, supra note 28, at 768.
30 Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299–300 (1988).
31 Id. at 300.
32 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); see U.S. CONST. amend. X.
33 Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 300.
34 See, e.g., Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, 181 F.3d 363, 366 (3d Cir. 1999); US Air-
ways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1324 (10th Cir. 2010).
35 See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486.
36 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
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aircraft component manufacturers.37 Finally, the FAAct contains
a “savings clause” designed to preserve state law remedies:
“Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way abridge or alter
the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the
provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies.”38 Due to
the FAAct’s narrow express preemption provisions, its implied
preemption powers are much more meaningful to the federal
government. Any preemption of state aviation law outside of
these provisions must be implied by courts.
An important distinction to understand is the difference be-
tween preemption of a standard of care and preemption of a
claim. For example, there are four elements to a typical state law
negligence claim: standard of care, breach, causation, and dam-
ages.39 In FAAct cases, preemption has recently centered around
the standard of care.40 Thus, while the standard of care may be
preempted by federal regulations, the remaining three elements
are still governed by state law.41 In a negligence claim, the FAA
has prescribed a standard of care, which courts have generally
found to preempt any applicable state standard of care.42 Simi-
larly, the requirements for receiving a type, production, or air-
worthiness certificate create a standard of care which
theoretically governs in product liability or defective design
claims.43 In practice, however, courts disagree about the extent
to which these standards actually preempt any parallel state law
standards.44
The Supreme Court has never spoken on the issue of negli-
gence or products liability in an aviation law case. However, in
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, the Court provided a
framework through which lower courts could analyze FAAct pre-
emption cases.45 In City of Burbank, the Court held that a city
37 General Aviation Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 3(3), 108 Stat.
1552, 1553 (1994).
38 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1106, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
39 See, e.g., V & M Star Steel v. Centimark Corp., 678 F.3d 459, 465–66 (6th Cir.
2012).
40 Alexander T. Simpson, Standard of Care vs. Claim Preemption Under the Federal
Aviation Act, 27 AIR & SPACE L. 4, 4 (2014).
41 Id.
42 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (“No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or
reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.”).
43 See Simpson, supra note 40, at 4.
44 See, e.g., Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 690 (3d Cir.
2016); Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999).
45 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
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noise prevention ordinance, which banned aircraft from taking
off between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m., was preempted by the FAAct, as
amended by the Noise Control Act of 1972.46 Although noise
prevention was an environmental regulation traditionally left to
states, the Court acknowledged the pervasive nature of the
FAA’s own aircraft noise regulation scheme and thus inferred
congressional intent to occupy the entire area of the law.47 The
Court stated that the FAAct required “a delicate balance be-
tween safety and efficiency,”48 and “[t]he interdependence of
these factors requires a uniform and exclusive system of federal
regulation if the congressional objectives underlying the Federal
Aviation Act are to be fulfilled.”49 While the FAAct contained no
express preemption provision on this subject, its legislative his-
tory coupled with the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory
scheme led the Court to conclude it was intended to preempt
state law.50
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
There are two competing views on how the FAAct interacts
with state aviation safety laws under the doctrine of implied pre-
emption. A court’s view of the FAAct’s preemption powers de-
pends largely on its interpretation of the Act’s legislative
history—some see a clear intent to exclude state regulations
from the aviation safety field, while others see Congress exercis-
ing restraint.51 The way a court defines the term “aviation safety”
will also factor into its analysis.52 The Second, Sixth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits have each held that the FAAct impliedly
preempts the entire field of aviation safety law,53 while both the
46 Id. at 633.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 638.
49 Id. at 639.
50 Id. at 636–37. The Senate version of the Noise Control Act contained an
express preemption provision, but was never presented to the House. Id. at 636.
Instead, the House version was presented with amendments. Id. (citing 18 CONG.
REC. 35,886 (1972)). However, Rep. Harley Staggers, Chairman of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, argued on the floor, “We have
evidence that across America some cities and States are trying to pass noise regu-
lations. Certainly, we do not want that to happen. It would harass industry and
progress in America.” Id. at 636–37 (citing 18 CONG. REC. 37,083 (1972)).
51 Compare Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, 181 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 1999), with
Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 683 (3d Cir. 2016).
52 See, e.g., Elassaad v. Indep. Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 127 (3d Cir. 2010).
53 Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2508 (2020); US Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318,
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Third and Eleventh Circuits have held that the Act only
preempts conflicting state laws.54
Ironically, the Third Circuit is also the source of one of the
most influential opinions applying field preemption to the
FAAct.55 In Abdullah v. American Airlines, the Third Circuit found
that the FAAct impliedly preempted the entire field of aviation
safety law, applying the federal standard of care to an aviation
negligence claim brought under state law.56 Although federal
law preempted the state law standard of care, the court held that
state damage remedies still existed for the violation of the fed-
eral standard of care.57 The court determined that Congress in-
tended for the FAAct to occupy the field of aviation safety law to
the exclusion of the states, basing its conclusion on both legisla-
tive history and persuasive authority from its sister circuits.58 The
court noted that Congress enacted the FAAct in response to a
series of “fatal air crashes between civil and military aircraft oper-
ating under separate flight rules.”59 Further, Senate Reports indi-
cated that Congress intended to vest authority for aviation safety
solely in the FAA, not in the states.60 The court went on to cite a
number of cases in which other circuits found that the FAAct
preempted state or local regulations in a certain area, which it
felt indicated the pervasiveness of the federal government’s reg-
ulatory control.61 Abdullah also established that the federal stan-
dard of care in aviation-related claims preempted any state or
1322 (10th Cir. 2010); Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir.
2007); Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 795 (6th Cir.
2005).
54 See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 683; Pub. Health Tr. v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d
291, 295 (11th Cir. 1993).
55 See Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 364–65.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 365.
58 Id. at 367.
59 Id. at 368 (citing United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir.
1969)).
60 S. REP. NO. 85-1811, at 5 (1958).
[A]viation is unique among transportation industries in its relation
to the Federal Government—it is the only one whose operations
are conducted almost wholly within the Federal jurisdiction, and
are subject to little or no regulation by States or local authorities.
Thus, the Federal Government bears virtually complete responsibility
for the promotion and supervision of this industry in the public
interest.
Id. (emphasis added).
61 See Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 369–71 (citing Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l. v.
Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d
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local standards of care.62 The court noted that FAA regulations
created a catch-all standard of care in the operation of aircraft,
and that it would be “illogical” for federal law to preempt state
law in matters such as pilot licensing, but not regulations relat-
ing to flight itself.63
The Third Circuit later clarified the extent of Abdullah’s hold-
ing in Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc.64 In Elassaad, a passenger
who was injured while disembarking from a plane brought a
state law negligence claim,65 which the court held was not pre-
empted by the FAAct.66 Abdullah’s holding was not that common
law negligence claims themselves were preempted, only that the
state law standards of care used in those claims were pre-
empted.67 The court noted that the regulations cited in Abdullah
established a standard of care for the operation of aircraft, but
the injury in Elassaad occurred while disembarking after the
plane had landed.68 The court admitted that the FAAct was de-
signed to reduce accidents in air transportation, and that the
FAA “has sole discretion in regulating air safety,” but limited the
definition of air safety in Abdullah to in-flight operations.69 Be-
cause federal regulations did not establish a standard of care for
negligence outside of the operation of the aircraft either in-
flight or while taxiing on the runway, the state law standard of
care was not preempted.70
In Tweed, the Second Circuit recognized at the outset of its
analysis that the FAAct impliedly preempts all state aviation
safety laws, then turned to whether the state law in question fell
400 (7th Cir. 1974); British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.
1977); French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989)).
62 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 372.
63 Id. at 371; 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2020).
64 613 F.3d 119, 121 (3d Cir. 2010).
65 Id. at 122.
66 Id. at 131.
67 Id. at 125.
68 Id. at 131.
69 Id. at 126 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
70 Id. at 127.
No person may operate an aircraft, other than for the purpose of
air navigation, on any part of the surface of an airport used by air-
craft for air commerce (including areas used by those aircraft for
receiving or discharging persons or cargo), in a careless or reckless
manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.
14 C.F.R. § 91.13(b).
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within the scope of the FAAct’s preemption.71 The state law at
issue limited the length of an airport’s runway, preventing the
airport from attracting new airlines.72 The airport claimed that
the statute was preempted by the FAAct, but was denied a de-
claratory judgment invalidating the statute by the district
court.73 The Second Circuit reversed, finding that a statute limit-
ing the length of an airport’s runway did fall within the scope of
federal preemption “because of its direct impact on air safety.”74
The court found “localized, state-created limitation[s]” like the
runway statute to be “incompatible with the FAAct’s objective of
establishing a ‘uniform and exclusive system of federal regula-
tion’ in the field of air safety.”75
The Tenth Circuit employed a two-pronged preemption ap-
proach in O’Donnell, concluding that a state law regulating alco-
hol service on aircraft was preempted by the FAAct.76 Like the
Second Circuit in Tweed, the court began its analysis with the
presumption that the FAAct impliedly preempts the entire field
of aviation safety based on the pervasiveness of the federal regu-
latory scheme.77 The first prong of the court’s field preemption
analysis was to identify the legislative field that the state law im-
plicated.78 While the district court viewed the state law as only
regulating alcoholic beverage service on airplanes, the Tenth
Circuit recognized that it “necessarily implicate[d] the field of
airline safety.”79 The second prong of the test was to evaluate
whether Congress intended to occupy that field to the exclusion
of state regulations, and the court determined it did.80 Sidestep-
ping a prior ruling that the FAAct did not preempt state tort
remedies because they were not named in the Act’s express pre-
emption provision, the court acknowledged that such a provi-
sion does not exclude the possibility of implied preemption as
well.81 The court found that both the pervasiveness of the
71 Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2508 (2020).
72 Id. at 69.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 74.
75 Id. (quoting Air Transp. Ass’n v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 224 (2d Cir. 2008)).
76 US Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1325–26 (10th Cir. 2010).
77 Id. at 1325.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1325–27.
81 Id. at 1326 (discussing Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1444
(10th Cir. 1993)).
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FAAct’s regulations and its legislative history indicated a clear
intent to regulate the aviation safety field exclusively, preempt-
ing the state alcohol regulations in question.82
In Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc., the Sixth Circuit
held that federal aviation standards preempted a state law duty
to warn claim in a products liability case.83 Like the Tenth Cir-
cuit in O’Donnell and the Third Circuit in Abdullah, the Sixth
Circuit relied on the legislative history and pervasiveness of the
FAAct, determining that it was intended to preempt the entire
field of aviation safety.84 The plaintiffs in Greene argued that the
manufacturer breached its duty to warn aircraft users about
manufacturing defects by failing to maintain a database tracking
potential equipment malfunctions.85 However, the plaintiffs
made no claims under federal laws or regulations, and were una-
ble point to any federal standard requiring a manufacturer to
maintain such a database.86 Therefore, the court found that the
additional state-imposed duty to warn of manufacturing defects
was invalid.87
The Third Circuit’s more recent decision in Sikkelee is seem-
ingly incompatible with Abdullah’s holding that additional state-
imposed standards of care in aircraft-related negligence cases
are preempted by the FAAct.88 In Sikkelee, the Third Circuit held
that field preemption does not apply to state law aircraft prod-
ucts liability claims and that the FAAct did not preempt state-
imposed standards of care in such claims.89 Instead, the court
determined that in aviation products liability cases, the FAAct
only preempted conflicting state laws and regulations.90 Like in
Elassaad, the court drew a line between “in-air operations” and
the issuance of safety certificates to aircraft manufacturers, once
again limiting Abdullah’s broad holding.91 The court pointed out
that the regulations cited in Abdullah related only to actually op-
erating an aircraft (i.e., flight), not its design or manufacture,
82 Id. at 1327.
83 Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 795 (6th Cir.
2005).




88 See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 372 (3d Cir. 1999).
89 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 683 (3d Cir. 2016).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 689.
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which was at issue in Sikkelee.92 The driving factor behind this
distinction was the way the federal standard of care in Abdullah
was articulated.93 The in-flight negligence regulation in Abdullah
sounded in common law tort, which the court felt made it com-
prehensive and practical to incorporate into state law claims.94
The design and manufacture regulations, on the other hand,
were much more technical and part-specific, making them “ex-
ceedingly difficult to translate into a standard of care that could
be applied to a tort claim.”95 In Elassaad, the Third Circuit noted
that most of the FAAct regulations concerned aspects of safety
associated with flight, specifically mentioning the certification
and airworthiness requirements for aircraft components.96 This
makes the court’s conclusion that the FAA certification process
was unrelated to in-flight safety even more confusing. Although
certification and airworthiness requirements may not govern in-
flight operations, they clearly concern in-flight safety, which the
court identified as the purpose of the FAAct in Elassaad.97 The
folly of Sikkelee’s holding was further proven on remand, where
the district court found the plaintiff’s state law claims to be con-
flict preempted, as it would be impossible for the manufacturer
to comply with both state and federal regulations.98
Sikkelee formed the basis of a similar decision by the Washing-
ton Supreme Court, which held that the FAAct created only
minimum standards of care for aircraft manufacturers99 and
that state law remedies exceeding that standard of care were not
preempted by the Act.100 In Estate of Becker, the estate of a plane
crash victim brought a state law design defect claim against the
92 Id.
93 Id. at 694.
94 Id. at 695.
95 Id.
96 See Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 128 (3d Cir. 2010).
97 See id. at 126.
98 Sikkelee v. AVCO Corp., 268 F. Supp. 3d 660, 665 (M.D. Pa. 2017). However,
the Third Circuit reversed on appeal, holding that federal law did not conflict
preempt the state law claims. Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 907 F.3d 701,
704 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 860 (2020). The court also reaffirmed its
prior holding that the FAA certification process does not establish a federal stan-
dard of care for aircraft manufacturers. Id. at 717.
99 48 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(1) (“The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration shall promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescrib-
ing . . . minimum standards required in the interest of safety for appliances and
for the design, material, construction, quality of work, and performance of air-
craft, aircraft engines, and propellers.”).
100 Estate of Becker v. AVCO Corp., 387 P.3d 1066, 1069 (Wash. 2017).
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manufacturer of a fuel system component in the aircraft.101 The
manufacturer claimed preemption as a defense, arguing that
fuel system manufacturing was pervasively regulated by the fed-
eral government.102 The court rejected the preemption argu-
ment, holding that the regulation in question was not designed
to replace state law, but only to establish a minimum design
standard.103
Like the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has also issued con-
flicting opinions about the reach of the FAAct’s preemption
powers.104 In Montalvo, the court held that the FAAct impliedly
preempted the entire field of aviation safety, dismissing the
plaintiffs’ consolidated failure to warn claims brought under
state law.105 Fourteen plaintiffs each brought negligence claims
against various airlines for failure to warn passengers about the
risk of deep-vein thrombosis, which airlines were under no fed-
eral obligation to do.106 The court recognized that in the ab-
sence of federal preemption of passenger warnings, each state
could mandate a different set of warnings, which could lead to
absurd outcomes.107 In Martin, however, the Ninth Circuit lim-
ited Montalvo’s holding to cases in which the federal regulations
in the field are pervasive.108 In Martin, the plaintiff brought a
design defect claim against an aircraft manufacturer, claiming
that the aircraft’s stairs were defectively designed because they
only had one handrail.109 In comparison to the FAA’s pervasive
regulations on passenger warnings, the only federal regulation
101 Id. at 1067.
102 Id. at 1068.
103 Id. at 1069.
104 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Martin
ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Exp. Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 811–12 (9th Cir.
2009).
105 See Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 468.
106 Id. at 467–68.
107 Id. at 473.
Congress could not reasonably have intended an airline on a Provi-
dence–to–Baltimore–to–Miami run to be subject to certain require-
ments in, for example Maryland, but not in Rhode Island or
Florida. It is equally as doubtful that Congress would have intended
the sufficiency of the Airlines’ warnings to hinge on where each
passenger on each flight was likely to file suit.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
108 See Martin, 555 F.3d at 811.
109 Id. at 808.
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of aircraft stairs prohibited designing them in a way which might
block emergency exits.110
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Lake Aircraft was similar to
that of the Tenth Circuit in Cleveland, relying almost exclusively
on the FAAct’s express preemption provision.111 The court de-
termined that Congress did not intend for the FAAct to preempt
state laws on matters unrelated to airline rates, routes, or ser-
vices, and therefore, the Act did not preempt state law design
defect claims.112 Lake Aircraft was one of the earliest cases on the
subject, and circuit courts’ preemption analyses have since cen-
tered around either the Second Circuit’s field preemption ap-
proach or the Third Circuit’s newer conflict preemption
approach.113
IV. ANALYSIS
A. THE CASE FOR FIELD PREEMPTION
Of all the industries regulated by the federal government, avi-
ation is arguably the most in need of a uniform set of laws and
regulations. The aviation industry is so integral to interstate
commerce114 that it would be counterintuitive for it not to be
governed by a uniform set of laws and regulations. The alterna-
tive to field preemption, in which aviation manufacturers are
potentially subject to a patchwork of different state regulations
and standards of care, is simply incompatible with the industry’s
structure.115 There are several arguments to be made in favor of
field preemption. First, the FAAct’s legislative history and pur-
pose indicate a clear intent to exclude states from regulating
110 Id. at 812. “It’s hard to imagine that any and all state tort claims involving
airplane stairs are preempted by federal law. Because the agency has not compre-
hensively regulated airstairs, the FAA has not preempted state law claims that the
stairs are defective.” Id.
111 Compare Pub. Health Tr. v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291, 295 (11th Cir.
1993), with Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1447 (10th Cir.
1993).
112 Lake Aircraft, Inc., 999 F.2d at 295.
113 See Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir.
2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2508 (2020); Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp.,
822 F.3d 680, 709 (3d Cir. 2016).
114 See generally Data & Statistics, AIRLINES FOR AM., https://www.airlines.org/
data/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
115 See Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 473 (9th Cir. 2007). “Aviation
transportation requires more national coordination than any other public trans-
portation and also poses the largest risks. Regulation on a national basis is re-
quired because air transportation is a national operation.” Id. (internal citations
omitted).
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aviation safety.116 Second, field preemption allows for a uniform
federal standard of care without necessarily preempting state
law claims and remedies.117 Finally, field preemption is more
consistent with related Supreme Court precedent and the pre-
emption doctrine’s constitutional roots.118
As previously mentioned, legislative intent is highly determi-
native of a federal law or regulation’s preemption powers.119 In
addition to legislative history, congressional intent to occupy an
entire field of law can be implied when federal regulation is suf-
ficiently pervasive, when the federal interest in the field is suffi-
ciently dominant, or when the objective of the federal
regulation and the character of its obligations show such a pur-
pose.120 The sheer amount of regulations that the FAA has
promulgated within the aviation safety field makes it difficult to
understand how a court could view the FAA’s regulations as any-
thing but pervasive.121 Another rule, which some courts seem to
have ignored, is often cited to when arguing that the FAA only
establishes a minimum standard for design and manufacture.122
Section 44701(e) governs the FAA’s acceptance of airworthiness
directives issued by foreign governments, yet makes no mention
of state governments.123 The FAA may accept foreign airworthi-
ness directives only in the event that its foreign counterpart has
a certification system requiring an equivalent level of safety as
the FAA does.124 Allowing foreign aviation safety agencies, but
not states, to certify airworthiness seems to indicate that Con-
gress intended to create a system in which there are only two
possible arbiters of aircraft safety—the FAA or its foreign
counterpart.125
Legislative intent is further clarified by looking at the legisla-
tive history associated with the FAAct. Congress emphasized the
unique nature of the aviation industry, which naturally made it a
federal concern:
116 See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 1999).
117 See Tweed, 930 F.3d at 75.
118 See supra Part III.B.
119 See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
120 See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988).
121 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 1–1399.
122 49 U.S.C. § 44701(e).
123 Id.
124 Id. § 44701(e)(5)(A)(iii).
125 Id. § 41302.
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[A]viation is unique among transportation industries in its rela-
tion to the Federal Government—it is the only one whose opera-
tions are conducted almost wholly within the Federal
jurisdiction, and are subject to little or no regulation by States or
local authorities. Thus, the Federal Government bears virtually
complete responsibility for the promotion and supervision of this
industry in the public interest.126
The circumstances prompting the FAA’s creation are also con-
sistent with an intent to establish a uniform federal regulatory
system. Congress passed the FAAct in response to a series of “fa-
tal air crashes between civil and military aircraft operating under
separate flight rules.”127 It would make little sense for Congress to
go to the trouble of passing such a comprehensive piece of legis-
lation only to leave the very problem it sought to address unad-
dressed. In City of Burbank, the Supreme Court afforded
significant weight to the legislative history of the FAAct, which it
felt was clearly designed to establish uniform regulations.128
That the Court reached this conclusion even after acknowledg-
ing that noise control regulation was traditionally a state police
power speaks volumes about the weight of the FAAct’s legislative
history.129
One of the primary concerns with field preemption the Third
Circuit expressed in Sikkelee was that it “would have the perverse
effect of granting complete immunity from design defect liabil-
ity to an entire industry.”130 However, because state law claims
should still be available in conjunction with the FAAct under
field preemption, this fear is misguided. The majority of circuit
courts have held that the federal standard of care in the opera-
tion of aircraft preempts any state law standards of care, while
leaving remedies for state law claims intact.131 Significantly, the
FAAct’s savings clause states that “[n]othing contained in this
[chapter] shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now
existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this
[chapter] are in addition to such remedies.”132 The language
126 S. REP. NO. 85-1811, at 5 (1958).
127 United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1969) (emphasis
added).
128 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 634–40 (1973).
129 See id. at 638.
130 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 695 (3d Cir. 2016).
131 See, e.g., Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999).
132 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1106, 72 Stat. 731, 798
(1958).
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here necessarily implies the existence of state law claims, as a
remedy could not exist without a claim.
Once again, it is important to remember the distinction be-
tween preempting a state law claim and a state law standard of
care. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Abdullah, federal law can pre-
empt the standard of care while leaving state tort remedies
intact:
[W]e find no irreconcilable conflict between federal and state
standards. Nor do we find that imposition of a . . . standard in a
damages action would frustrate the objectives of the federal law.
Quite to the contrary, it is evident in both the savings and the
insurance clauses of the [FAAct] that Congress found state dam-
age remedies to be compatible with federal aviation safety stan-
dards. The savings clause provides that a remedy under this part
is in addition to any other remedies provided by law. Clearly,
Congress did not intend to prohibit state damage remedies by
this language.133
In Ventress v. Japan Airlines, the Ninth Circuit held that a plain-
tiff’s state law claims were preempted by the FAAct, but did so in
a manner consistent with the reasoning set forth in Abdullah.134
In Ventress, the plaintiff failed to allege a violation of any applica-
ble federal aviation safety standard, pleading only state law un-
lawful retaliation and constructive termination claims in
response to his termination.135 The court acknowledged that
while state law claims and remedies were hypothetically available
under Abdullah’s holding, the plaintiff’s failure to allege a claim
under any applicable federal standard warranted preemption.136
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Greene invalidated the entire fail-
ure to warn claim brought under state law because it hinged on
the existence of a federal standard requiring manufacturers to
maintain a malfunction database.137 Had there been both fed-
eral and state law standards requiring such a database, the fed-
eral standard would have preempted the state standard. Even
absent a federal equivalent, the state law standard was pre-
empted because it was supplementary to the federal regulatory
scheme.138 In Sikkelee, the Third Circuit framed the issue as
133 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 375 (internal quotations omitted).
134 Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 747 F.3d 716, 723 n.7 (9th Cir. 2014).
135 Id. at 719–20.
136 Id. at 723 n.7.
137 See Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 794–95 (6th
Cir. 2005).
138 Id. at 795.
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whether the FAAct preempted state law product liability claims,
rather than just the standard of care.139 However, the court also
rejected arguments that federal regulations established an appli-
cable standard of care for aircraft design and manufacturing.140
Its primary reasoning was that the design certification process—
type, production, and airworthiness certificates—only estab-
lished the procedures for federal approval of aircraft and their
components, lacking the comprehensiveness to supply the stan-
dard of care in a products liability case.141
The federal certification process does exactly that, however.
The FAA’s design safety standard is actually set forth through
the type certification process.142 In addition to type certificates,
the FAA may issue special conditions to manufacturers if its stan-
dard regulations are inadequate for a product, such as a compo-
nent the administration is unfamiliar with.143 The standard for
issuing a type certificate is exacting on manufacturers, and the
language within the regulation purports to establish a standard
for design:
Upon examination of the type design, and after completing all
tests and inspections, that the type design and the product meet
the applicable noise, fuel venting, and emissions requirements of
this subchapter, and further finds that they meet the applicable
airworthiness requirements of this subchapter or that any airwor-
thiness provisions not complied with are compensated for by fac-
tors that provide an equivalent level of safety.144
Prior to this testing phase, an applicant for a type certificate
must also show compliance with all applicable requirements.145
Even if not explicitly, 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.20–.21 seem to establish an
across-the-board standard for aircraft design and manufacture.
Had the Third Circuit recognized this distinction, it could have
simply applied this federal standard of care to the state law
claim, rather than relying on a state law standard requiring addi-
tional design considerations.
The Supreme Court has held that federal regulations estab-
lish a uniform standard of care in the design and manufacture
139 See Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 692 (3d Cir. 2016).
140 See id. at 694.
141 Id.
142 Lauren L. Haertlein & Justin T. Barkowski, Applying a Federal Standard of
Care in Aviation Product Liability Actions, 82 J. AIR L. & COM. 743, 760 (2017).
143 Id.
144 14 C.F.R. § 21.21 (2020) (emphasis added).
145 Id. §§ 21.20–.21.
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of oil tankers, which is governed by a regulatory scheme similar
to that of the aviation industry.146 In Ray, a Washington state law
established safety standards exceeding those required by the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA).147 Much like
the FAA, the DoT oversaw a pervasive regulatory system includ-
ing certification of oil tanker design and inspections for ongo-
ing compliance under the PWSA.148 Especially significant is how
the Court addressed the issue of “minimum standards” in the
PWSA.149 Courts that reject field preemption argue that federal
regulations establish only a minimum standard for design and
manufacture.150 In Ray, however, the Court found that the per-
vasive nature of the PWSA regulatory scheme established more
than just a minimum standard.151 The Court noted that in addi-
tion to the power to promulgate safety standards, the PWSA
gave the federal government authority to ensure compliance
through certificates and inspections, prompting its conclusion
that the PWSA preempted the entire field of marine safety
regulations.152
This indicates to us that Congress intended uniform national
standards for design and construction of tankers that would fore-
close the imposition of different or more stringent state require-
ments. In particular, as we see it, Congress did not anticipate that
a vessel found to be in compliance with the Secretary’s design
and construction regulations . . . would nevertheless be barred by
state law from operating in the navigable waters of the United
States on the ground that its design characteristics constitute an
undue hazard.153
The similarities between the two federal regulatory schemes
are readily apparent: both establish a comprehensive certifica-
tion process in design and manufacture, and federal control of
American waters is analogous to federal control of American air-
146 See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 163 (1978).
147 Id. at 154.
148 Id. at 161–62.
149 Id. at 161. The Court noted the PWSA requires promulgation of “compre-
hensive minimum standards of design, construction, alteration, repair, mainte-
nance, and operation” for certain vessels. Id.
150 See Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 694 (3d Cir. 2016);
Estate of Becker v. AVCO Corp., 387 P.3d 1066, 1069 (Wash. 2017).
151 Ray, 435 U.S. at 163.
152 Id. at 162–63.
153 Id. at 163–64.
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ways.154 Much like the Court observed in Ray, it would make lit-
tle sense for aircraft meeting federal design standards to be
subject to liability in certain states with more stringent stan-
dards. The Court cited the legislative history of the PWSA, which
also indicated an intent to preempt state law: “The original
Tank Vessel Act, amended by Title II, sought to effect ‘a reason-
able and uniform set of rules and regulations concerning ship
construction.’”155 The FAA’s parallel aircraft certification system
should therefore indicate an equal intent. The FAAct and PWSA
also mirror each other in their acceptance of foreign safety certi-
fications.156 The PWSA contains a nearly identical provision al-
lowing the federal government alone to accept the safety
certifications of foreign vessels,157 which the Court also felt indi-
cated congressional intent to preempt the entire field of mari-
time safety law.158
Given that the federal design certification process establishes
a standard of care for design and manufacture, it is much
harder to reconcile the Third Circuit’s distinction between in-
air operations and pre- or post-flight regulations. The court
noted in Sikkelee that the examples of the pervasive regulations it
had cited in Abdullah only applied to in-air operations, leaving
certain regulations, such as those applying to type certificates,
outside the reach of the FAAct’s preemption powers.159 Accord-
ing to the court, the design regulations governing type certifi-
cates were not as comprehensive as those governing pilot
certification and other aspects of in-flight operations, therefore
the FAAct established only minimum safety standards rather
than a catch-all standard of care for design and manufacture.160
Naturally, the court pointed out that the FAAct grants the FAA
the authority to prescribe “minimum standards” required “in the
interest of safety” and “necessary for safety.”161 The existence of
“minimum” federal standards, however, does not necessarily im-
ply that states have the power to supplement those standards.
Rather, the use of the word “minimum” was intended to strike
154 Thomas J. McLaughlin, Mary P. Gaston, & Jared D. Hager, Navigating the
Nation’s Waterways and Airways: Maritime Lessons for Federal Preemption of Airworthi-
ness Standards, 23 AIR & SPACE LAW. no. 2, 2010, at 5, 9.
155 Ray, 435 U.S. at 165–66 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 74-2962, at 2 (1936)).
156 McLaughlin, supra note 154, at 9.
157 46 U.S.C. § 3303.
158 See Ray, 435 U.S. at 163.
159 See Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 689 (3d Cir. 2016).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 693; 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a) (emphasis added).
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an optimal balance between adequately ensuring safety in air-
craft design and manufacturing, and facilitating economic
growth by avoiding overly burdensome regulations.162 It would
make little sense for the federal government to prescribe inade-
quate safety regulations and allow each state to decide whether
to supplement them. If that were the case, Congress would be
knowingly risking the lives of passengers on aircraft designed or
manufactured in a state which declined to supplement the mini-
mum federal standard of care. Such a result would be clearly
inconsistent with Congress’s stated goal of ensuring “maximum
possible safety and efficiency” through the FAAct.163
Field preemption is necessary in order to establish a uniform
federal standard of care for aircraft manufacturers. This is the
primary problem with the Third Circuit’s holding in Sikkelee—
the FAAct does not prevent plaintiffs in product liability claims
from also bringing state law claims supplying their own stan-
dards of care.164 Allowing plaintiffs to bring tort claims under
state laws applying different standards of care subjects aircraft
manufacturers to a patchwork of different standards, making it
impracticable—if not impossible—to realistically comply with
each of them.165 Because aircraft manufacturers have essentially
zero control over where an aircraft goes after its sale, forcing
them into compliance with both a federal design standard and
potentially fifty different state standards is simply unreasona-
ble.166 Allowing state law to govern the standard of care in an
aviation products liability claim is also problematic because it
displaces the expertise of the FAA. The FAA employs a highly
technical certification process which governs manufacture and
design throughout the life of the aircraft.167 In contrast, state
standards of care developed through litigation allow the FAA’s
complex certification process to be second-guessed by expert
witnesses, judges, and juries.168
Applying the federal standard of care to state law product lia-
bility claims provides more predictability for aircraft manufac-
turers, while also ensuring a more accurate outcome in each
case. Under state law, the standard of care in a negligence claim
162 See Haertlein & Barkowski, supra note 142, at 759.
163 H.R. REP. NO. 85-2360, at *3747 (1958).
164 See id.
165 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 473 (9th Cir. 2007).
166 See Haertlein & Barkowski, supra note 142, at 757.
167 Id. at 758.
168 Id.
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would be established primarily through expert testimony and a
strict liability claim would hinge on whether the jury finds a de-
sign defect.169 This usually involves weighing the feasibility of al-
ternative designs, which may or may not be relevant to the
specific issue being litigated.170 A jury verdict against a manufac-
turer thus means that the product design was unsafe for opera-
tion, even though the design was approved by the FAA when it
issued a type certificate.171 Thus, the court supersedes the FAA’s
role in certifying aircraft and imposes a duty on the manufac-
turer to comply with a design standard which may be inconsis-
tent with those prescribed by the FAA.172 This lack of uniformity
increases litigation costs due to the reliance on expert witnesses,
while forcing manufacturers to spend more on insurance to pro-
tect themselves from such inconsistent standards.173 Manufactur-
ers will ultimately pass these higher costs along to consumers,
negatively impacting both sides of the market.174
By integrating the federal standard of care set forth through
the certification process into state law claims, the focus at trial
instead becomes whether the product met the FAA’s standards,
rather than those established by expert witnesses.175 The issu-
ance of a type certificate would constitute prima facie evidence
that no defect exists, shifting the burden to the plaintiff to show
that the manufacturer failed to comply with the basis of its certi-
fication in that instance.176 Although this may present a hurdle
for plaintiffs, the federal standard of care provides a more accu-
rate definition of a product defect, while also giving manufactur-
ers more certainty from state to state.
As a starting point in any future Supreme Court case on the
issue, the presumption against federal preemption should not
be so powerful. The presumption primarily applies to the extent
that Congress attempts to preempt state law in an area that the
169 Id. at 765–66.
170 Id. at 766.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See Geoffrey M. Hand, Should Juries Decide Aircraft Design? Cleveland v. Piper
Aircraft Corp. and Federal Preemption of State Tort Law, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 741, 743
(1995).
174 Id.
175 See id. at 785–86.
176 Id. at 802.
530 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
states have traditionally occupied.177 This concern is typical to
preemption cases, but is likely irrelevant in the aviation context.
The Supreme Court has already acknowledged that the pre-
sumption against preemption does not apply to federal mari-
time safety regulation,178 a field with a similar history of federal
control. The Third Circuit in Sikkelee somehow failed to find a
significant history of federal involvement in aviation safety regu-
lation, stating that “aviation torts have been consistently gov-
erned by state law” before citing an aviation safety case decided
under state law—in 1914.179 While the court then cites to addi-
tional cases decided under state law, this line of jurisprudence—
on its own—could hardly be considered convincing evidence
that aviation law is an area of traditional state occupation. The
federal government did not begin regulating aviation safety un-
til 1926,180 primarily because it was a fledgling industry. Since
1926, however, Congress has exhibited a marked interest in reg-
ulating American airways, and its regulatory schemes have
shown an intent to exclude states from further regulation.181
From a constitutional perspective, when applied to the FAAct,
field preemption is more appropriate than conflict preemption.
Regardless of the doctrine’s source—the Supremacy Clause or
the Necessary and Proper Clause—field preemption seems to be
the clear choice. The Supremacy Clause route is rather simple:
Congress has spoken on the issue, therefore excluding states
from further regulation. Under the Supremacy Clause, the Con-
stitution and federal laws are the supreme law of the land.182 If
the FAA purports to establish standards for aircraft manufacture
and design, as it has through its detailed certification system,183
states should naturally be excluded from imposing additional
standards. The FAA’s multi-level certification system establishes
a comprehensive safety standard for not only the aircraft, but
each of its components as well.184 Therefore, allowing standards
177 See John C. Nettels, Jr. & Jerrick L. Irby, Standard of Care Preemption in Avia-
tion Litigation: Halting Steps to a Coherent Analysis, 76 J. AIR. L. & COM. 327, 335
(2011).
178 United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (“An assumption of nonpre-
emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has
been a history of significant federal presence.”).
179 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 690 (3d Cir. 2016).
180 See Air Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
181 See A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 6.
182 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
183 See supra Part II.A.
184 Haertlein & Barkowski, supra note 142, at 764.
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of care defined by states to govern in aviation product liability
cases would undermine the federal regulatory scheme, which
has already established a standard of care for aircraft design and
manufacturing.185 Relying on principles of conflict preemption
would provide little clarity in comparison with the current re-
gime—although federal law may preempt conflicting state stat-
utes, it would be up to the courts to decide when exactly this
preemption has occurred, which could lead to inconsistent
outcomes.186
Though the Supreme Court has often stated that preemption
is rooted in the Supremacy Clause,187 preemption can also be
viewed as a product of the Necessary and Proper Clause, as Pro-
fessor Stephen A. Gardbaum argues.188 The crux of his argu-
ment is that the supremacy of federal law means that when both
state and federal law within a certain area are valid, the federal
law overrides the state law.189 Therefore, under the Supremacy
Clause, state law still has full effect provided it avoids conflicting
with federal law.190 Preemption, on the other hand, means that
states have no power to act in the given field, regardless of
whether they conflict with any federal laws.191 Gardbaum argues
that under the Necessary and Proper Clause, preemption is sim-
ply a means of allowing Congress to effectively exercise its enu-
merated powers.192 This often requires a uniform set of laws or
regulations to accomplish, especially when regulating interstate
commerce.193 Aviation safety is no exception—as an integral
part of interstate commerce,194 it should be governed by a uni-
form set of laws and regulations. Aviation is a fundamental inter-
state industry which was quite literally invented to travel across
state and national borders, making it uniquely suited for federal
regulation. This is precisely what the Supreme Court made clear
in City of Burbank: if the congressional objectives underlying the
FAAct are to be fulfilled, balancing safety and efficiency requires
185 Id.
186 See supra Part II.B.
187 See, e.g., Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 366 (3d Cir. 1999).
188 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Gardbaum, supra note 28, at 781–82.
189 Gardbaum, supra note 28, at 770.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 771.
192 Id. at 782.
193 Id. at 781.
194 Data & Statistics, supra note 114.
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a uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation.195 How-
ever one chooses to interpret the source of preemption, field
preemption is more consistent with the Constitution when ap-
plied to the field of aviation safety.
B. APPLYING Tweed to Other Circuits
Given both the importance of uniform aviation regulation
and the degree to which the circuits differ in their analysis of
FAAct preemption, the Supreme Court will likely speak on the
issue in the near future. Although the denial of certiorari for
Tweed was certainly disappointing for the aviation industry, the
silver lining is that a future decision may provide more clarity
than one tailored to Tweed’s facts. The Second Circuit was clear
in its view that the FAAct was intended to preempt the entire
field of aviation safety, but it never indicated whether that in-
cluded the applicable standard of care for design and manufac-
ture.196 Thus, a Supreme Court decision in Tweed may have been
limited to the runway statute at issue in the case rather than
addressing the broader question of the FAAct’s overall preemp-
tion power.197 Although Tweed will not be heard before the Su-
preme Court, its preemption analysis should guide other circuit
courts.
The preemption analysis in Tweed is also much simpler than
the Third Circuit’s approach in Sikkelee, making it easier for
other circuit courts to apply. The Second Circuit began by ac-
knowledging its own precedent that the FAAct impliedly pre-
empted the entire field of aviation safety.198 Thus, the question
became whether the statute fell within the scope of preemption
by having a direct impact on air safety.199 The Third Circuit had
also previously held that the FAAct preempted the entire field of
aviation safety in Abdullah,200 but limited “aviation safety” to in-
195 See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638–39
(1973).
196 See Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir.
2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2508 (2020).
197 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Tweed, 930 F.3d 65 (No. 19-375). The
question presented to the Court was “[d]oes the Federal Aviation Act preempt a
state law limiting the length of an airport runway, thereby depriving a State from
determining the size and nature of a local airport?” Id. at ii.
198 See Tweed, 930 F.3d at 74 (citing Goodspeed Airport, LLC v. E. Haddam
Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Comm’n, 634 F.3d 206, 210–11 (2d Cir. 2011)).
199 See id.
200 See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 376 (3d Cir. 1999).
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flight operations in Elassaad and Sikkelee.201 This narrow defini-
tion of aviation safety requires courts to perform a preemption
analysis for any aviation safety law not directly governing in-
flight operations. Under the Tweed approach, a court has only
one question to answer: does the law directly impact aviation
safety?
Of course, circuits yet to decide on the issue have little di-
rectly applicable precedent with which to start their FAAct pre-
emption analysis. In the interest of uniformity, these circuits
should adopt the majority view that the FAAct impliedly
preempts the entire field of aviation safety law. These courts
could undertake their own preemption analysis or simply side
with the weight of persuasive authority, which the Second Cir-
cuit did in Goodspeed.202 After adopting the majority view, the
court need only determine whether the law in question falls
within that field.
This simpler analysis is preferable for several reasons. First,
analyzing aviation safety laws under the presumption of field
preemption ensures more consistent application of the law na-
tionwide. Analyzing congressional intent and the pervasiveness
of regulation in every subset of aviation safety law runs the risk
of contradicting the federal government’s interest in uniformity.
Second, the requirement that a state law must directly affect avi-
ation safety in order to fall within the scope of preemption pro-
vides more certainty to state and local authorities about the
extent of their regulatory power. This is especially important in
the absence of a Supreme Court decision, as it will conserve
state and local government resources which might otherwise be
spent litigating preemption challenges brought by private par-
ties. Finally, agreement among circuits will benefit the aviation
industry by providing more geographic uniformity for manufac-
turers regarding design and manufacturing standards.
The Tweed analysis is also compatible with establishing a uni-
form federal standard of care for aircraft design and manufac-
turing. Preempting additional state-based standards of care
would require proving that the federal regulations directly im-
pact aviation safety, which is not too high a burden. FAA type
certificate regulations require that aircraft and their compo-
201 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 689 (3d Cir. 2016);
Elassaad v. Indep. Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 127 (3d Cir. 2010).
202 See Goodspeed, 634 F.3d at 210 n.5.
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nents meet a “level of safety,”203 which seems to be an obvious
case for preemption under Tweed. Imposing a uniform federal
standard of care does not prevent plaintiffs from bringing prod-
uct liability or design defect claims under state law. Rather, only
state law standards of care would be preempted by the FAA reg-
ulations, as they directly impact aviation safety. The focus at trial
then shifts from establishing a design defect through expert tes-
timony to proving that the manufacturer failed in that instance
to comply with the requirements of its FAA certification.204 This
should allow for a more accurate determination of whether a
design defect actually exists. This also ensures aircraft manufac-
turers will not be subjected to different standards of care based
on where an accident occurs, which is almost entirely out of
their control.
V. CONCLUSION
The American aviation industry requires a set of uniform laws
and regulations in order to operate at maximum efficiency. As it
stands, aircraft manufacturers are subject to a wide variety of
safety standards governed by state tort law—a system which is
simply incompatible with the nature of the aviation industry.
Field preemption is more consistent with both the intended pur-
pose of the FAAct and the unique nature of the aviation indus-
try. Unique as it is, the industry’s regulatory scheme is also very
comparable to regulations on maritime safety, which has proven
to be an industry suited for uniform federal control. Courts that
have declined to apply field preemption to the FAAct have done
so in a misguided manner, either misinterpreting the purpose
of the FAAct or misunderstanding the nature of the aviation
industry.
Integrating federal design and manufacturing standards into
state law tort claims is the optimal regulatory approach for the
aviation industry, as it would provide clarity and certainty for
manufacturers while also simplifying the trial process in negli-
gence and products liability claims. Insulating manufacturers
from the patchwork of different standards of care will lower
203 14 C.F.R. § 21.21(b)(1). The FAA may issue a type certificate if it “finds that
they meet the applicable airworthiness requirements of this subchapter or that
any airworthiness provisions not complied with are compensated for by factors
that provide an equivalent level of safety.” Id. (emphasis added); see also id.
§ 21.21(b)(2) (requiring “that no feature or characteristic makes [an aircraft]
unsafe”).
204 See Hand, supra note 173, at 743.
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both their litigation and insurance costs, savings which can be
passed onto consumers. Uniform federal standards would also
ensure that the subject matter experts, not judges and juries,
decide whether an aircraft or component met the applicable de-
sign standards in each case.
Ideally, the Supreme Court will step in and resolve the circuit
split in the near future. Until then, the Second Circuit’s deci-
sion in Tweed should serve as a template for other circuit courts
that have yet to decide on the issue. This will ensure maximum
possible uniformity in federal aviation regulation and will bene-
fit the judicial system, state and local governments, the aviation
industry, and ultimately, the consumer.
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I. INTRODUCTION
FOR MOST EMPLOYEES, the question “Where do I work?” isnot one that ever comes to mind. But for some workers, par-
ticularly those in the airline industry, a thicket of conflicting lo-
cal, state, and federal laws, along with work that regularly takes
them across state lines, raises serious questions about where ex-
actly the work is being performed—and more importantly, what
rights and protections apply. While workers can be certain that
some federal laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA) or Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA) apply to them no
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matter where they work in the country, the applicability of state
and local labor laws that provide additional protections like Cali-
fornia’s wage and hour laws or New York City’s paid sick leave
law is much less certain. This confusion has only been magnified
by some states’ recent assertions of extraterritorial authority to
apply their wage and hour laws to workers located outside of
their borders. In light of this uncertainty and the growing num-
ber of cases stemming from it, there exists a clear need for legis-
lative intervention to preempt conflicting state and local labor
laws and to bring uniformity to the field.
Part II of this Comment provides the historical background of
federal wage and labor law, with a particular focus on how it has
developed for workers in the railway industry, and how that his-
tory shaped the field of airline labor law. Part III examines the
current state of the conflicting federal, state, and local laws, the
recent cases arising out of such conflict, and the assertions of
extraterritorial authority. Part IV advocates for nationwide uni-
formity in labor law for aviation workers, divorcing the labor
rights of airline workers from the RLA, and outlines the policy
implications of letting the current thicket of conflicting laws
worsen. Part V proposes an amendment to Title 49 of the U.S.
Code (Title 49) that would grant the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) the authority to regulate the labor of airline work-
ers and establish a comprehensive framework of labor and wage
laws that will preempt state and local regulations.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Though the development of labor law in the United States has
a long and storied history dating back to the slave trade, the
modern statutory framework finds its roots in several critical
pieces of legislation in the early twentieth century. Prior to the
passage of these seminal pieces of legislation, courts around the
country were striking down protections for workers as unconsti-
tutional, including laws limiting the number of hours an em-
ployee could work in 1905,1 prohibiting conditioning
employment on an agreement to not join a union in 1915,2
prohibiting child labor in 1918,3 and establishing minimum
wage standards for women and children in 1923.4 Subsequent
1 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
2 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915).
3 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918).
4 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 561–62 (1923).
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acts like the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA)5 and
the FLSA6 were radical grants of rights and protections to em-
ployees in a legal environment that had previously been inimical
to them. These two acts built on the foundations of others like
the RLA,7 which provided much needed protections only to
workers in certain industries—that is, the railroad industry, and
later, airline industry. These acts, and the subsequent court deci-
sions upholding them, signaled a sea change in American juris-
prudence toward protecting the rights of workers and, to this
day, serve as the foundation of labor law in the United States.
A. FOUNDATIONS OF AIRLINE WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES: THE INHERITED HISTORY OF RAILWAY
WORKERS’ COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
One of the first instances of collective bargaining and its sub-
sequent suppression by the judiciary came out of Pennsylvania
in the late 1700s. There, a group of shoemakers formed a proto-
union to respond to the increasing labor hardships of an indus-
trializing society and to secure fair wages for its members.8 This
union, however, did not have a long lifespan, and after just ten
years, a suit was brought against members of the union for the
criminal charge of conspiracy in Commonwealth v. Pullis.9 Eight
of the union’s leaders were found guilty of the crime of illegally
conspiring to raise their wages, effectively criminalizing unions
in Pennsylvania.10 The result of Pullis left the legal status of un-
ions in question in other parts of the country, and there were at
least eighteen other instances of early union members being
prosecuted for conspiracy over the course of the next three
decades.11
It would not be until 1842 that a court would declare that
labor unions were in fact legal enterprises and not criminal con-
spiracies.12 That case, Commonwealth v. Hunt, coincidentally also
dealing with shoemakers, set the stage for the legality of collec-
5 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69.
6 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–03.
7 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88.
8 Walter Nelles, The First American Labor Case, 41 YALE L.J. 165, 166–67 (1931).
9 3 Doc. Hist. 59 (Phila. Mayor’s Ct. 1806); Omar Swartz, Defending Labor in
Commonwealth v. Pullis: Contemporary Implications for Rethinking Community, 8
HOLY CROSS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 79, 80 n.10 (2004).
10 Id. at 80.
11 Edwin E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825, 826 (1926).
12 Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111, 136 (1842).
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tive bargaining in the United States,13 and Chief Justice Shaw’s
majority opinion is widely regarded as “the Magna [Carta] of
American trade-unionism.”14 In Hunt, Chief Justice Shaw made
the distinction between the mere concept of a combination of
workers seeking to use collective bargaining to regulate their
wages—a union—and the methods a union might employ to se-
cure higher wages or other protections.15 By drawing such a
line, Chief Justice Shaw reframed the debate from whether a
union itself amounted to an illegal conspiracy to whether the
objectives sought by the union and methods used to accomplish
such objectives were themselves legal.16 Though the debate over
the precise demarcation of when union action crosses into ille-
gal territory continues to this day, Chief Justice Shaw’s formula-
tion would prove highly influential, with only three conspiracy
cases in the subsequent twenty years brought against workers.17
Though Chief Justice Shaw laid the groundwork for the legality
of unions and their ability to strike lawfully, his opinion would
do little to stem oncoming tides of conflict between workers and
their employers in an increasingly industrial society.18
Strikes would prove to be the tool of choice for American
workers in combatting poor working conditions, low wages, and
overall governmental hostility to the interests of workers.19 The
tensions between workers and their employers came to a head in
1877, when workers—frustrated with repeated pay cuts, shoul-
dering the burden of an economic depression, and the efforts of
employers to stifle the potency of unions—staged what would be
the first nationwide strike in American history, with estimates of
nearly 500,000 workers walking out from their jobs in July
1877.20 Characterized as the “Great Strike” or the “Great Insur-
rection,” the strikes of July 1877 began along America’s exten-
sive railroad system.21 No longer constrained to a mere local
group of disgruntled shoemakers like the unions in Pullis and
Hunt, the Great Strike involved workers of the railroad corpora-
13 Id.
14 LEONARD LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW
183 (1957).
15 Witte, supra note 11, at 828.
16 Id.
17 LEVY, supra note 14, at 206.
18 Witte, supra note 11, at 828.
19 MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, 1877: AMERICA’S YEAR FOR LIVING VIOLENTLY 144
(2010).
20 Id. at 145.
21 Id.
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tions—some of the largest and most influential corporations in
America at the time—the same corporations that played a criti-
cal role in America’s rapid industrialization.22
The increased stakes and heightened impacts of the railway
worker strikes resulted in an increase in the severity of the re-
sponse—this time, rather than taking the striking unions to
court, corporate leaders resorted to force almost immediately.23
When local police forces and state militias—many of them hold-
ing sympathies to the cause of the striking workers24—were una-
ble or unwilling to enact the will of corporate leaders, the
leaders turned to recently inaugurated President Rutherford B.
Hayes.25 Indebted to the corporate leaders who had supported
his presidential campaign, President Hayes authorized federal
troops to suppress the strikes—a rarely used option—and the
Great Strike marked the first time federal troops were used on a
nationwide scale to quash a strike.26
President Hayes’s decision to acquiesce to the demands of
railway corporations and authorize the use of federal force
would ultimately end the strikes, but not without bloodshed,27
destruction of property,28 and the garnering of much public
support for the unions.29 The victory of the corporations would
prove to be a Pyrrhic one, as the landscape of labor relations
had been forever changed.30 It had become clear to the workers
that they could not rely on the current governmental institu-
tions to side with their interests over those of the wealthy railway
owners,31 and it had become clear to the nation’s elite that the
influence and power of a unified working class could have devas-
tating results for the country.32
Responses to the new landscape were mixed; some industrial-
ists raised wages in order to keep their workers happy and
loyal,33 while others like Andrew Carnegie saw only the danger-
ous aspects of unions and conditioned hiring workers on their
22 Id. at 145–46.
23 Id. at 145.
24 Id. at 149.
25 Id. at 146.
26 Id. at 145–46.
27 Id. at 175.
28 Id. at 155–58.
29 Id. at 156.
30 Id. at 190.
31 Id. at 179.
32 Id. at 175.
33 Id. at 168.
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agreement to not join one34—a practice that would later be-
come known as a “yellow-dog contract.”35 Workers who had lost
faith in elected public officials turned to the ballot box in order
to secure their rights.36 And, having witnessed the existential
threat that a striking railway workforce imposes on the country’s
economy,37 it became imperative for the political leaders to pre-
vent such a massive strike from occurring again. The federal
government’s early attempts to mediate the interests of the rail-
way owners and workers would take place through a series of
failed legislation that ultimately culminated in the still extant
RLA in 1926.38
B. THE LEAD UP TO MODERN LAW GOVERNING AIRLINE
EMPLOYEES: BACKGROUND TO THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
Still hot on the heels of the Great Strike of 1877, political
leaders in state governments had great incentive to encourage
harmonious resolution of disputes between unions and employ-
ers. To facilitate such resolution, several states began passing
legislation to arbitrate labor disputes as early as 1878, though
the state statutes ultimately proved to be feckless.39 However,
these statutes provided the groundwork for a federal statute’s
inception. Given the recent history of railway strikes and the rail-
way industry’s susceptibility to such strikes, the impact those
strikes had on the national economy, and the fact that railways
were clearly engaged in interstate commerce, it is of little sur-
prise that the first federal law on labor arbitration would arise in
the context of railway labor disputes.40 As a result, President
Grover Cleveland signed into law the Arbitration Act of 1888
(Arbitration Act), which provided an arena for voluntary arbitra-
tion of railway labor disputes.41 However, much like the previ-
ously ineffective state laws, voluntary arbitration failed to solve
the disagreements between the unions and railway owners: in
the Arbitration Act’s ten-year lifespan, voluntary arbitration was
34 Id. at 154.
35 Joel I. Seidman, The Yellow Dog Contract, 46 Q.J. ECON. 348, 348 (1932).
36 BELLESILES, supra note 19, at 187–88.
37 Id. at 175.
38 Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The Early
Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 373, 386 (1983).
39 Id. at 380–81.
40 Id. at 382.
41 Id.; Arbitration Act of 1888, Pub. L. No. 64-252, 39 Stat. 721 (1888) (re-
pealed 1898).
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not used once.42 The Arbitration Act’s requirement of impartial
and disinterested mediators, slow-moving bureaucracy, and in-
ability to bring both sides to the table resulted in a wholly inef-
fective piece of legislation, which was quickly replaced.43
The Arbitration Act’s follow-up, the Erdman Act of 1898
(Erdman Act),44 sought to correct the deficiencies of the Arbi-
tration Act.45 The Erdman Act removed the requirement of hav-
ing impartial mediators and established a permanent
commission with the power to prevent strikes and firings during
an investigation.46 With the exception of a single failed attempt
to invoke an arbitration proceeding, the Erdman Act was not
used at all during the first eight years of its existence.47 But this
changed beginning in 1906, and it was invoked in sixty cases
from 1906 to 1913.48 The most important change was perhaps
the ability to appeal arbitration rewards to federal courts.49 Un-
fortunately, the increased use resulted in increased disapproval
of the Erdman Act, as decisions affecting millions of dollars and
thousands of workers were often made by an outside mediator
with little to no knowledge of the industry.50 Eventually, dissatis-
faction with the mediators’ decisions led to both unions and rail-
way leaders refusing to use the Act, and threats of an incoming
strike galvanized Congress to pass yet another version of the
bill.51
The 1913 edition of the legislation, the Newlands Labor Act
(Newlands Act),52 again sought to correct perceived deficiencies
in the previous versions, this time establishing a permanent
three-member board of remediation and conciliation utilizing
mediators from within the industry.53 This version received
more use than previous iterations, handling seventy-one dis-
putes between 1913 and 1917, though it ran into an impasse in
1916 after unions asserted that their demand for an eight-hour
42 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 382.
43 Id. at 383.
44 Erdman Act of 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898) (repealed 1913).
45 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 383.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 383–84.
49 Id. at 385.
50 Id. at 384.
51 Id.
52 Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration Between Carriers and Employees,
ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103 (1913) (repealed 1926).
53 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 384–85.
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workday was not a question suitable for the three-member board
to resolve.54
With the threat of yet another strike mounting, Congress
passed the Adamson Eight-Hour Act of 1916 (Adamson Act),55
which established an eight-hour workday and overtime pay for
railway workers.56 Fervently contested by railway owners, the
Adamson Act was litigated all the way up to the Supreme Court,
and, in 1917, the Supreme Court upheld the ability of Congress
to regulate the workday and overtime compensation for inter-
state railway workers,57 a surprising change of pace for a Court
that had struck down New York’s attempt to limit the amount of
hours worked in a bakery to ten hours a day as unconstitutional
just twelve years prior.58
While the goings-on of the railway industry had largely been
an insular affair, in 1918, the mounting need for a nationally
unified railway entity due to the demands of World War I re-
sulted in the nationalization of the railway industry under the
Railway Administration Act.59 The nationalization of the coun-
try’s railway system would last a few years, until 1920, when the
railways returned to private ownership.60 However, the relative
harmony in which railways operated for the years of nationaliza-
tion signaled that improvements still could be made to the Newl-
ands Act, and as a result, Congress passed yet another version,
the Transportation Act of 1920 (Transportation Act).61
The Transportation Act, however, largely regressed from the
improvements made in previous iterations, with both labor un-
ions and railway executives seeking to replace the legislation.62
The Transportation Act mandated use of arbitration proceed-
ings, but the decisions were ultimately toothless because they
were not legally enforceable.63 However, contrary to prior laws,
the Transportation Act was widely used, and the newly estab-
lished board was inundated with nearly 14,000 cases over its five-
54 Id. at 385.
55 Adamson Eight-Hour Act, Pub. L. No, 64-252, 39 Stat. 721 (1916) (current
version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 28301–02).
56 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 385.
57 Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 359 (1917).
58 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 63–64 (1905).
59 Railway Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 65-107, 40 Stat. 451 (1918) (re-
pealed 1920); Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 385.
60 Id.
61 Id.; Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456 (1920).
62 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 386.
63 Id. at 385.
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year lifespan.64 The dissatisfaction from both railway owners and
union officials led the parties to begin drafting their own ver-
sion of the law, which was then proposed to Congress.65 That
version was ultimately passed in 1926 as the RLA.66
The RLA, further amended in 1934 to fix some deficiencies
and again in 1936 to include the airline industry within the Act’s
purview, remains the governing law over labor relations in both
the railway and airline industries to this day.67 The RLA governs
the handling of disputes within the industries, utilizing a single
organization, the National Railroad Adjustment Board
(Board).68 As a result of comprehensive negotiations, the RLA
contains significant concessions for both sides: labor unions
largely gave up their ability to strike without first going through
the Board, but gained the ability to sue employers in federal
court for violations of the RLA.69 The ability to bring suits for
violation of the RLA on their own volition distinguishes railway
and airline workers from most other employees in the country,
who are subject to the NLRA of 1935, which gives the National
Labor Relations Board exclusive standing to sue.70 This right is a
direct result of the long-fought history of railway workers in the
early stages of an industrializing United States.
While the 1934 amendments sought to correct several defi-
ciencies of the original Act, the 1936 amendments were added
to extend the Act to the fledgling airline industry.71 The RLA
was extended to the airline industry for a myriad of reasons: sim-
ilar to the railway industry, the airline industry dealt with inter-
64 Id.
65 Id. at 386.
66 Id.; Railway Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (cur-
rent version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88).
67 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 386.
68 Id. at 387.
69 Id. at 387–88.
70 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
The term “employer” includes any person acting as an agent of an
employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United
States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Fed-
eral Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or
any person subject to the Railway Labor Act as amended from time to
time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an em-
ployer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such
labor organization.
Id. (emphasis added).
71 A. J. Harper II, Major Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act, 35 J. AIR L. & COM.
3, 3 (1969).
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state commerce, making it ripe for federal legislation, and the
airline industry had an immediate need for thorough and effec-
tive regulations, which the RLA could provide.72 By doing so, it
established uniformity between the industries.73 Additionally, by
1936, nearly every other facet of the airline industry was subject
to close regulation, and there was no compelling reason to ex-
clude labor from the norm.74 However, while the RLA undoubt-
edly provided a much-needed framework at the industry’s
emergence, the airline industry has continued to be burdened
by a system that was not designed with its needs in mind.75 As
will be discussed in Part IV.A, the modern needs of the airline
industry have only exacerbated its growing pains within the
framework of the RLA, and either an amendment to existing
federal frameworks or a new statute is required to adequately
respond to the current landscape.
C. NON-UNION LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS: THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE LOCHNER ERA
While the development of the RLA was largely a fifty-year pro-
cess of iterative legislation insulated from other labor develop-
ments in the United States, the modern rights of both railway
and airline workers are further enmeshed in a broader net of
protections, combining the RLA, Supreme Court precedent,
and other federal legislation such as the FLSA of 1938.
Around the same time that the Supreme Court upheld the
Adamson Act in 1917, limiting the working day of railway em-
ployees to eight hours, the Court had been consistently striking
down other extensions of protections to workers.76 Dubbed the
“Lochner era” after the Court’s ruling in Lochner v. New York
(striking down a state law limiting the working day to ten
hours), the Court’s decisions in this era were characterized by a
laissez-faire approach to the labor market.77 Strictly protecting
the principle that individuals were free to enter into contracts of
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 James B. Frankel, Judicial and Regulatory Decisions, 18 J. AIR L. & COM. 461,
461–62 (1951).
75 Id. at 477–79.
76 See supra Part II.
77 Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (1991).
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their choice, the Lochner Court rejected the idea of a “paternal
government” interfering with the liberty of contract.78
However, the Lochner era began on shaky ground, as it was not
fully supported by precedent, and it would be a mere three de-
cades before the Lochner jurisprudence fully collapsed in 1937.79
The laissez-faire principles undergirding the Lochner era stood at
odds with an earlier ruling in Holden v. Hardy, which upheld reg-
ulations preventing individuals from contracting in ways that
harmed themselves.80 In fact, it would only be twelve years
before Lochner’s specific holding regarding the validity of maxi-
mum hours legislation would be overruled, though the perni-
cious logic behind its reasoning would persist.81 In Bunting v.
Oregon, the Court upheld a state law limiting the working day to
ten hours and providing time-and-a-half overtime for hours
worked past the limit, overruling the particular holding in
Lochner.82
Despite Bunting overturning Lochner, the era would continue
with some of its most notorious decisions in the years to come.
Just a year after Bunting, the Court struck down a federal law
prohibiting the sale of products made by child labor in inter-
state commerce in Hammer v. Dagenhart.83 The decision in Adkins
v. Children’s Hospital soon followed, where the Court struck
down another federal law providing protections for workers, this
time mandating a minimum wage for female employees in the
District of Columbia.84 Grasping at straws to distinguish the deci-
sion from that of Bunting, the Court focused on the difference
between laws regulating wages and those regulating hours as suf-
ficient grounds to differentiate it from Bunting.85 The Lochner
era’s tenuous grasp of logic would soon lead to its downfall, and
the overruling of Adkins sounded the death knell of the era. In
1937, the Court heard yet another case regarding the minimum
wage, and in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Court struck the
killing blow to the Lochner jurisprudence and upheld a mini-
mum wage.86
78 Id. at 9.
79 Id. at 52.
80 Id. at 19.
81 Id. at 19–20.
82 Id. at 19–20, 19 n.78; Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 439 (1917).
83 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918).
84 Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560–61 (1923).
85 Id. at 550–51.
86 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
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With the looming threat of the Court striking down labor reg-
ulations finally over, hardly a year elapsed between the fall of
the Lochner era and the passage of a comprehensive set of fed-
eral labor regulations. The FLSA established a national base
level minimum wage, prohibited the employment of children,
capped the work week at forty-four hours, and provided time-
and-a-half overtime pay on work past the cap—a monumental
expansion of worker protections, and one that President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt characterized as the most important piece of
New Deal legislation next to the Social Security Act.87 The FLSA
would be challenged shortly after on the grounds that it could
not proscribe child labor given the precedent of Hammer v.
Dagenhart, and the Supreme Court was given a chance to strike
down the FLSA. However, in United States v. Darby Lumber Co.,
the Court unanimously upheld the FLSA, abolishing the last ves-
tiges of the Lochner era and overturning Hammer.88 While the
FLSA has been amended many times since its passage, the core
of the legislation nonetheless persists as the national bare mini-
mum of worker rights and protections for employees engaged in
interstate commerce.
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Bolstered by both the RLA and the FLSA, in addition to appli-
cable state and local laws, it would seem at first glance that air-
line workers must be some of the most protected workers in the
country. While airline workers benefit in some areas from the
years of collective labor bargaining that led to the passing of the
RLA, the RLA was written with railway workers in mind, and it
continues to be a poor fit for the airline industry. For employees
in the airline industry, the multi-jurisdictional nature of their
work, combined with conflicting state and local laws and the
lack of a uniform federal standard to preempt such laws, sub-
jects airline workers to a confusing thicket of inconsistent laws
that can obfuscate their rights.
87 Howard D. Samuel, Troubled Passage: The Labor Movement and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, MONTHLY LAB. REV. Dec. 2000, at 32, 32, 36; see also Jared Bernstein
& Ross Eisenbrey, Eliminating the Right to Overtime Pay, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 25,
2003), https://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_flsa_jun03/ [https://
perma.cc/V49R-7LTK].
88 United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941).
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At odds with the age-old legal maxim of ubi jus ubi remedium
(where there is a right, there is a remedy),89 there can be no
remedy if a worker does not know that she has that right to be-
gin with. Especially given the fact that federal legislation like the
RLA or FLSA merely sets out the bare minimum protections
that are often exceeded by state and local laws like California’s
wage and hour law90 or Washington’s Paid Sick Leave Act
(PSLA),91 an airline worker uncertain of her rights may in fact
end up with fewer protections than a worker who never leaves
the city or state and is certain of her rights.
A. THE BARREN FIELD: A LACK OF CLEAR FEDERAL PREEMPTION
A critical issue for a worker in determining her rights is the
lack of clarity on what laws apply when and the overall absence
of unambiguous federal protections. On the whole for workers
outside of the airline industry, the lack of federal preemptive
standards tends to benefit workers given the bare minimum
standards presented in the federal statutes and the additional
protections workers receive through more comprehensive state
and local laws. Many states have passed higher wage and hour
rates than the FLSA base level, with twenty-nine states (plus
Washington, D.C., Guam, and the Virgin Islands) exceeding the
federal minimum wage.92 The ability of states to pass higher
standards was clearly an intentional feature of the FLSA and is
laid out in § 218(a) of the Act. Colloquially referred to as the
“savings clause,” the FLSA states that “[n]o provision of this Act
or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with
any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance” establishing a
higher minimum wage or shorter maximum work week.93 As has
been held by the Third Circuit, “the statute’s plain language
evinces a clear intent to preserve rather than supplant state law.”94
The savings clause allows states and local municipalities to ex-
89 Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Ap-
proach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 71, 78 n.47 (2001).
90 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11090 (2020).
91 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.46.210 (West 2020).
92 See Consolidated Minimum Wage Table, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.: WAGE & HOUR DIV.
(Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/mw-consolidated [https://
perma.cc/5YX7-RP4X].
93 29 U.S.C. § 218(a).
94 Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 675 F.3d 249, 262 (3d Cir. 2012) (emphasis ad-
ded); see also Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 430 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“According to § 218(a), . . . state law supersedes the collective bargaining
agreement.”).
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tend greater protections to workers in their jurisdiction than
would otherwise be available through the FLSA.
Though the RLA does not have a corollary to the savings
clause, the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that RLA
preemption “extends only as far as necessary to protect the role
of labor arbitration in resolving [collective bargaining agree-
ment] disputes.”95 In line with this precedent, the RLA only
preempts state law when a state law claim arises entirely from or
requires construction of a collective bargaining agreement.96 As
such, the RLA does not preempt state law claims to enforce
rights independent of a collective bargaining agreement, such
as minimum labor standards.97
Since neither the FLSA nor the RLA preempt state law in the
vast majority of circumstances, this would ordinarily simplify the
analysis—a worker is subject to the standards in the RLA or
FLSA, then any standards in the state or municipality of her job
that exceed the federal baseline. However, this analysis is con-
founded when an employee does work in multiple jurisdictions,
such as an employee who spends most of her time working in
Dallas, Texas, but who attends a trade conference in Los Ange-
les, California. In that scenario, the labor laws of both Dallas
and Texas would apply to the worker as she does her work in
Dallas, but when she arrives in Los Angeles, she becomes subject
to the laws and protections of California and local laws of Los
Angeles. As the Supreme Court has held, “[a] basic principle of
federalism is that each state may make its own reasoned judg-
ment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its
borders.”98 This principle was upheld in Sullivan v. Oracle, where
the California Supreme Court held that the California Labor
Code’s overtime protections applied to work performed in Cali-
fornia by out-of-state plaintiffs on short-term trips.99
However, dealing with airline employees who can potentially
cross hundreds of state borders in each pay period pushes this
scenario to its logical extreme, with potentially multiple differ-
ent and conflicting labor standards applying to employees
95 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 913–14 (9th Cir. 2018) (en
banc), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1445 (2019); see also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris,
512 U.S. 246, 262–64 (1994); Lingle v. Norge Div. Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,
413 (1988).
96 Matson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 1126, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2016).
97 Norris, 512 U.S. at 256.
98 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
99 Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 241 (Cal. 2011).
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within a span of minutes. This issue is only confounded further
by states that then assert extraterritorial jurisdiction to apply
their wage and hours laws to workers who are neither residents
of the state nor employees of a resident employer. The RLA’s
inability to deal with this problem through federal preemption
only furthers the need to divorce the airline industry from this
outdated and ill-fitting piece of legislation.
B. THE STICKY HAND: EXTRATERRITORIAL ASSERTION OF STATE
WAGE AND HOURS LAWS
Some states have begun to apply their wage and hour statutes
to employees who live or work outside of the state’s jurisdiction.
Unlike the FLSA, which expressly limits its application to work
performed within the United States and its territories,100 many
state wage and hour statutes hold no such geographic limita-
tions. There have been four categories of these laws being ap-
plied extraterritorially to: (1) “out-of-state employees working
in-state for resident employers”; (2) “out-of-state employees
working out-of-state for resident employers”; (3) “resident em-
ployees working in-state for out-of-state employers”; and (4) “res-
ident employees working out-of-state for resident employers.”101
First, in terms of laws being applied extraterritorially to out-of-
state employees working in-state for resident employers, Califor-
nia,102 Illinois,103 and Massachusetts104 have extended their pro-
tections to all instances of work performed in the state,
100 29 U.S.C. § 213(f).
Employment in foreign countries and certain United States territo-
ries: The provisions of sections 206, 207, 211, and 212 of this title
shall not apply with respect to any employee whose services during
the workweek are performed in a workplace within a foreign coun-
try or within territory under the jurisdiction of the United States
other than the following: a State of the United States; the District of
Columbia; Puerto Rico; the Virgin Islands; outer Continental Shelf
lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act . . . ; Ameri-
can Samoa; Guam; Wake Island; Eniwetok Atoll; Kwajalein Atoll;
and Johnston Island.
Id.
101 Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Extraterritorial Application of State Wage
and Hours Laws, 29 A.L.R. 7th, art. 7 (2017).
102 Maez v. Chevron Texaco Corp., No. C 04-00790 JSW, 2005 WL 1656908, at
*2, *8–9 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2005) (rejecting Defendant’s argument that Califor-
nia law was inapplicable); Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 243 (Cal. 2011).
103 Adams v. Catrambone, 359 F.3d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying Illinois
law).
104 Dow v. Casale, 989 N.E.2d 909, 913 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013).
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regardless of the resident status of the employee. Second, for
out-of-state employees working out-of-state for resident employ-
ers, Kansas,105 Kentucky,106 and Washington107 have held that
their state wage and hour statutes may apply to protect employ-
ees who may never have even set foot in the state as long as their
employer was based in that state. Third, instances of resident
employees working in-state for out-of-state employers and hav-
ing access to the wage and labor laws of the state have been
found in some capacity in Connecticut,108 Delaware,109 and
Massachusetts.110
The fourth category, and perhaps the most relevant category
for workers within the airline industry, deals with the extraterri-
torial assertion of wage and labor laws for resident employees
working out-of-state for a resident employer. So far, Califor-
nia,111 New York,112 Pennsylvania,113 and Washington114 have ex-
tended such rights in some capacity. Bernstein, out of the
Northern District of California, dealt precisely with the issue of
whether flight attendants, who are based in California but spend
only about a quarter of their time in the state, have access to the
broad protections provided by California’s wage and labor
laws.115 The court held that the workers fell under the protec-
105 Harlow v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 574 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1226–27 (D. Kan.
2008) (applying Kansas law).
106 Himmelheber v. ev3, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-593-H, 2008 WL 360694, at *11
(W.D. Ky. Feb. 8, 2008) (applying Kentucky law).
107 Woods v. Mitchell Bros. Truck Line, Inc., No. 3304-6-II, 2008 WL 496803, at
*2 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2008).
108 Goldberg v. Goodwill Indus., No. CV054009642, 2006 WL 224124, at
*14–15 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2006).
109 Redick v. E Mortg. Mgmt., LLC, No. 11-1260-GMS-CJB, 2013 WL 1089710,
at *1–2, *41–42 (D. Del. Mar. 15, 2013).
110 Taylor v. E. Connection Operating, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 408, 409 (Mass. 2013).
111 Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 3d 1049, at 1055–56, 1063–64
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (applying California law); Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Brad-
shaw, 927 P.2d 296, 309 (Cal. 1996).
112 Heng Guo Jin v. Han Sung Sikpoom Trading Corp., No. 13-CV-6789 CBA
LB, 2015 WL 5567073, at *25–26 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2015) (denying summary
judgment on Defendant’s extraterritoriality argument because “[n]either party
has briefed the choice of law analysis”).
113 Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. 07-01702, 2009 WL
2015126, at *10–11 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (noting that “[n]othing within the
language of the statute implies that work performed in a foreign country by a
Pennsylvania resident does not deserve the same protections as work performed
within Pennsylvania by the same resident and for the same company”).
114 Bostain v. Food Exp., Inc., 153 P.3d 846, 858 (Wash. 2007); Miller v. Farmer
Bros. Co., 150 P.3d 598, 606 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
115 Bernstein, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 1060.
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tion of California’s laws and rejected the idea that “job situs [is]
the dispositive factor to determine whether California’s wage
and hour laws apply.”116 This view, read in conjunction with the
California Supreme Court precedent coming out of Sullivan v.
Oracle, covers both those who are based in the state but perform
the majority of their work outside the state, and those based
outside the state who perform some work within the state.117
The holdings in Bernstein and Sullivan were reinforced in
Goldthorpe v. Cathay, which dealt with pilots who were based in
California but spent the majority of their time either in federal
airspace or outside the country.118 The court held that the pilots
were still under the protection of California’s wage and hours
laws, reasoning that there was:
no categorical rule that California’s wage and hour protections
can only apply if most of an employee’s work is performed within
the state, and the presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion does not prevent the application of California wage and
hour law to transportation workers based in California who travel
interstate. Absent such a categorical rule, and absent the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application, it is difficult to
think of a reason why California law should not apply in this situ-
ation. After all, California’s wage and hour laws . . . were de-
signed to protect workers, and to prevent employers from
exploiting their bargaining advantage by denying workers fair
wages and tolerable working conditions. Courts must construe
these laws “with an eye towards the purposes [they] were meant
to serve, and the type of person they were meant to protect.”119
While this bodes well for airline workers who live or frequently
work in California, what of airline workers across the country?
For airline workers in Washington, the question is much more
complicated, and they only receive the benefits of Washington’s
PSLA if they are a “Washington-based” employee.120 This is an
ad hoc determination and considers a multitude of factors such
as: (1) where the employment agreement was made; (2) the em-
ployee’s domicile; (3) the location of the employer’s base of op-
erations; (4) the location of the employee’s base of operations;
116 Id. at 1059–60.
117 Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 243 (Cal. 2011).
118 Goldthorpe v. Cathay Pac. Airways, 279 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1005 (S.D. Cal.
2018).
119 Id. at 1004–05 (internal citations omitted).
120 Air Transp. Ass’n Am. v. Wash. Dep’t Lab. & Indus., 410 F. Supp. 3d 1162,
1168 (W.D. Wash. 2019).
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(5) whether the employer maintains a work site in Washington;
(6) whether the employee leaves Washington as part of the job;
(7) where work assignments come from; (8) where supervisors
are located; (9) the amount of work done in Washington; and
(10) the length of the contract to work in Washington.121
Though Washington is willing to give less weight to certain fac-
tors depending on the circumstances, e.g., “[f]or flight crew,
who do not spend very much time working in any one place,
[Washington Department of Labor & Industries] has indicated
that location of work is given less weight,” even a seemingly dis-
positive factor like being domiciled at a Washington airport
would not be enough to grant flight crew protections under the
law without satisfying other factors.122 Given the relative strin-
gency of Washington’s determination for granting protections
compared to the leniency of California’s, it does not take much
to imagine a scenario in which an airline worker whose base of
operations is out of a Washington airport and who is a resident
of Washington, but whose employer is based out of California
and who frequently travels to California as a result, receives
much greater protections under California labor laws than those
of her own home state of Washington.
Thus arises the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction—
though California is seeking to increase the rights and protec-
tions of workers, the thought that an out-of-state domiciled and
working employee would have greater protections in California
than in her home state runs contrary to common sense. And a
right without the knowledge that one has it is hardly a right at
all.
Additionally, this confusion harms employers as well as em-
ployees. While employees may not know their rights, the only
thing they lose for that ignorance is their ability to exercise the
right. However, the stakes are much higher for airline corpora-
tions, who can rack up massive civil liability to their employees if
found to have violated provisions of either the FLSA or state
law.123 In the case of Bernstein, Virgin Airlines racked up over
$85 million in backpay and civil and statutory liabilities.124 Em-
ployers are stuck wading through the murk to try to figure out
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 E.g., John Petrick, Virgin America Calls Bid for $85M in Wage Case ‘Excessive’,
LAW360 (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1102248 [https://
perma.cc/7SZM-6PN7].
124 Id.
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which laws are applicable to their employees, which quickly be-
comes a Sisyphean task as their workers may work in any num-
ber of states in a single pay cycle. The only recourse airlines have
against potential wage and hour violations would be to adopt
the highest standard of all the jurisdictions where they do busi-
ness, which could become a financially ruinous undertaking.
C. THE COVERAGE GAP: INADEQUACIES IN THE FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ACT
At approximately 9:00 a.m. on June 30, 1956, United Airlines
Flight 718 and Trans World Airlines Flight 2, both regularly
scheduled passenger flights to the Midwest, took off from Los
Angeles International Airport.125 A mere hour and a half later,
the two planes collided over the Grand Canyon, destroying both
aircraft and resulting in the deaths of all passengers and crew,
with 128 lives lost.126 Both pilots followed the existing protocol
and reported to communication stations that they would be fly-
ing over the Grand Canyon at the same altitude at the same
time, but the flight controller with that information was under
no obligation to inform the pilots of their impending crash
course.127 In the pre-FAA world, it was the responsibility of the
pilots alone to keep clear of other aircraft.128 This crash went
down in history as the deadliest commercial aviation collision at
the time and marked the first instance of a commercial airline
collision resulting in more than 100 deaths.129 However, the
deaths were not completely in vain, as public outrage over the
outdated and ineffective air traffic control system that resulted
in the crash would galvanize the creation of the Federal Aviation
Agency (later known as the FAA).130
125 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., REP. NO. SA-320/1-0090 MIDAIR COLLISION, ACCI-
DENT INVESTIGATION REPORT, TRANS WORLD AIRLINES LOCKHEED 1049A N6902C
AND UNITED AIR LINES DOUGLAS DC-7 N6324C, OVER THE GRAND CANYON, ARI-
ZONA, JUNE 30, 1956, ¶¶ 2, 7 (1957), https://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/
look.php?report_key=1251 [https://perma.cc/L3DP-QTAL].
126 Id. ¶ 1.




129 Grand Canyon Collision Declared a National Historic Landmark, GRAND CANYON
VISITOR CTR. (May 1, 2014), https://explorethecanyon.com/grand-canyon-colli-
sion-declared-a-national-historic-landmark/ [https://perma.cc/ZMV3-59HN].
130 Id.
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Just two years after the 1956 Grand Canyon collision, Presi-
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 (FAAct) into law.131 The FAAct’s purpose was to regulate
the safety and efficiency of the airways, providing a comprehen-
sive series of regulations that covered most aspects of the airline
industry.132 The agency would later become known as the FAA
when it was consolidated into the Department of Transportation
(DoT) in 1967, and the FAA continues to be the governing body
for commercial airline regulation and standards.133
The field of airline safety was uniquely ripe for federal regula-
tion because air travel takes place almost entirely within federal
jurisdiction, requires more coordination than any other form of
public transportation, and poses the largest risk to safety when
done carelessly.134 “Regulation on a national basis is required
because air transportation [itself] is a national operation.”135 As
the court in Montalvo held, “[t]he FAA, together with federal air
safety regulations, establish complete and thorough safety stan-
dards for interstate and international air transportation that are
not subject to supplementation by, or variation among,
states.”136 In other words, the FAA is used to preempt the entire
field of aviation safety—“[f]ield preemption occurs if federal law
‘thoroughly occupies’ the ‘legislative field’ in question, i.e., the
field of aviation safety. . . . Such a purpose properly may be in-
ferred . . . where the federal interest in the field is sufficiently
dominant.”137 The Third Circuit succinctly summarized it as fol-
lows: “[F]ederal law establishes the applicable standards of care
in the field of air safety, generally, thus preempting the entire
field from state and territorial regulation.”138 Despite the FAA’s
broad authority in the field of air safety, the administration is
entirely silent on the issue of wage and labor laws for employees
within its industry.
131 A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.
faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/#birth [https://perma.cc/9QAN-7B9V].
132 Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, pmbl., 72 Stat. 731, 731 (1958).
133 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 131.
134 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 473 (9th Cir. 2007).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 474.
137 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1999).
138 Id.
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IV. THE NEED FOR REFORM IN AIRLINE LABOR
LEGISLATION
In an industry where nearly every facet is now closely regu-
lated on a federal level, the thicket of conflicting and confusing
law surrounding airline labor rights is truly an anomaly. This
Comment proposes adding federal legislation that would ex-
pressly preempt state wage and hour laws. The current system
fits poorly within the RLA, causes needless litigation, and obfus-
cates the rights of workers. A uniform legislative framework will
better provide for the needs of workers, increase the overall
safety of the industry, and minimize litigation between workers
and airlines over disagreements about pay and rights.
A. TAKING THE TRAINING WHEELS OFF: THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
HAS OUTGROWN THE RLA
Though the RLA may have provided a useful legal framework
for the airline industry in the 1930s, changes in society, new
technological advancements, and the growth of the industry as a
whole have evinced a need for an updated legal framework tai-
lored to the needs of the airline industry. Two critical factors
interfere with the RLA’s ability to serve the needs of the airline
industry: its bespoke past and its age.
Not only have there been massive changes to the industry in
the interim, but the 1936 amendment to the RLA bundled the
rights of airline workers into an act “designed by and for the
railroad industry.”139 As discussed in Part II, the RLA was the
particular product of half a century of railway strikes, negotia-
tions between railway unions and owners, and legislative at-
tempts to balance the interests of the parties, and the final draft
of the RLA itself was written by the railway unions and owners
together.140 The unique past of the RLA makes it especially un-
suitable for application to a new industry, and whether it actu-
ally provided a benefit to the nascent aviation field is subject to
some controversy, as other transportation industries developed
labor protections without the need of specialized treatment like
the railroad industry.141 Because the RLA was drafted to deal
with the specific intricacies of railway labor relations, it contains
several oddities that were the result of concessions made in ne-
139 James B. Frankel, Airline Labor Policy: The Stepchild of the Railway Labor Act, 18
J. AIR L. & COM. 461, 461 (1951).
140 Id. at 466–67.
141 Id. at 471.
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gotiations between unions and owners. For example, as early as
1952, commentators were concerned with the RLA’s inapplica-
bility to a fledgling industry:
the lack of a remedial forum for both employees and employers
that can expertly administer the relationships intended by the
[RLA] and both interpret and enforce its provisions is a basic
weakness. . . . Such a framework would not seem to be conducive
to the development of the most sensible labor-management rela-
tions in a new and growing industry, however satisfactory in the
more stabilized railroad industry.142
Second, not only was the RLA drafted to deal specifically with
the railway industry, but it was drafted close to a century ago
with few amendments. The airline industry of the modern-day
shares little in common with its predecessor in 1936—it has
faced changing levels of regulation and deregulation, has en-
countered technological developments, and has struggled to
deal with bankruptcies and mergers.143 In addition, the impact
of the September 11th terror attacks permanently changed the
landscape of the airline industry, with air carriers being forced
to shoulder many of the costs of compliance with increased
safety regulations.144 These changes have reached the critical
point where “the RLA is no longer adequate to ensure protec-
tion for airline employees.”145
This is not a problem that is necessarily unique to the RLA—
the need to respond to changes in the rapidly evolving aviation
field spurred the Montreal Convention of 1999 (Montreal Con-
vention). With striking similarities to the need to replace the
outdated RLA and standardize labor rights for workers through-
out the country, the Montreal Convention supplanted the out-
dated Warsaw Convention of 1929 (Warsaw Convention) and
standardized the field of airline liability on international
flights.146 The Montreal Convention was an acknowledgement
that the concerns that faced the start of the airline industry in
the early twentieth century—at the Warsaw Convention, the
142 Malcolm A. Macintyre, The Railway Labor Act—A Misfit for The Airlines, 19 J.
AIR L. & COM. 274, 288 (1952).
143 Lisa Catherine Tulk, The 1926 Railway Labor Act and the Modern American
Airline Industry: Changes and Chaos Outline the Need for Revised Legislation, 69 J. AIR
L. & COM. 615, 627 (2004).
144 Id. at 628.
145 Id. at 645.
146 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air preamble, opened for signature May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. 13038, 2242 U.N.T.S.
309.
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concern was limiting liability in order to foster growth of the
nascent industry147—were not the same concerns that faced the
present industry. For many of the same reasons that the RLA
needs to be updated or replaced, calls to ratify the Montreal
Convention over the Warsaw Convention focused on the present
system of fractured and disparate laws depending on the juris-
diction, and the ability of a uniform standard to “simplify, clarify
and expedite the fair resolution of [disputes].”148
And, much like the Warsaw Convention, the RLA’s inadequa-
cies have led to a fractured field of law because there is no unify-
ing authority. The RLA only preempts state law when a state law
claim arises entirely from or requires construction of a collective
bargaining agreement.149 As such, the RLA does not preempt
state law claims to enforce rights independent of a collective
bargaining agreement, such as minimum wage standards or sick
leave.150
Nearly a century old, the RLA simply cannot do enough to
support the modern-day aviation industry, and ought to be re-
placed. Part V proposes new legislation that would supplant the
RLA and bring the labor rights of workers in the aviation indus-
try into the twenty-first century.
B. THE INTERSECTION OF LABOR LAWS AND PASSENGER SAFETY:
INCREASED PROTECTIONS FOR AIRLINE WORKERS WILL
DIRECTLY TRANSLATE INTO INCREASED SAFETY
FOR PASSENGERS
The airline industry is uniquely situated as one of the most
closely regulated industries in the country, and the vast majority
of its operations are conducted within federal jurisdiction—the
airspace. Airlines are heavily regulated by the FAA, which was
formed in order to have a single, uniform system for regulating
airline safety after a series of fatal crashes between civilian and
military aircraft.151 The catastrophic impact of mismanaged
flights was the key impetus in forming the FAA, and the Su-
preme Court has characterized FAA regulations as striking “a
delicate balance between the safety and efficiency” of planes in
147 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 546 (1991).
148 David E. Rapoport & Hans Ephraimson-Abt, A 73-Year Odyssey: The Time Has
Come for a New International Air Liability System, 2002 ISSUES AVIATION L. & POL’Y
22,151, 22,171 (2002).
149 Matson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2016).
150 Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 256 (1994).
151 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F. 3d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 2007).
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the sky and maintaining protections for persons on the
ground.152 This delicate balance and the interdependence of
the safety of persons in the sky and on the ground justified the
requirement of a “uniform and exclusive system of federal regu-
lation if the congressional objectives underlying the [FAAct] are
to be fulfilled.”153
However, one facet of airline safety has slipped through the
cracks and has not been regulated by the FAA—sick days and
vacation days of airline staff. While perhaps not what immedi-
ately comes to mind when one thinks of airplane safety—consid-
ering devices such as oxygen masks, parachutes, and chairs that
function as floatation devices—pilot fatigue represents “one of
the biggest threats to air safety.”154 Hardly a decade has passed
since the tragic crash of Continental Flight 3407 outside of Buf-
falo, New York in 2009.155 Fatigue was cited as a cause of the
crew’s failure to adequately respond to the rapidly declining
plane, which ended up stalling and plunging into a house—kill-
ing the pilots, flight attendants, all the passengers, and a man on
the ground—resulting in fifty deaths overall.156 While the odds
of a commercial flight crashing are extremely low, “figures show
that 80% are a result of human error, with pilot fatigue account-
ing for 15–20% of human error in fatal accidents.”157 In the ac-
cident report conducted on the crash, the National
Transportation Safety Board compared fatigue impaired per-
formance with alcohol impairment:
[S]leep loss is at least as potent as ethanol in its performance-
impairing effects and two hours of sleep loss equates to a breath
ethanol concentration of approximately .05% . . . correlat[ing]
prolonged wakefulness with impairment, such that being awake
for 16 hours is equivalent to a .05 [blood alcohol content].158
Despite the clear link between crew fatigue and increased risk of
harm, the FAA has not stepped in to guarantee sufficient time
152 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638–39
(1973).
153 Id. at 639.
154 Keith Moore, Pilot Fatigue ‘One of the Biggest Threats to Air Safety’, BBC NEWS





158 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/AAR-10/01, PB2010-910401, ACCIDENT
REPORT, LOSS OF CONTROL ON APPROACH COLGAN AIR, INC. OPERATING AS CONTI-
NENTAL CONNECTION FLIGHT 3407, at 3 (2009).
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off for airline crews. This leaves states and municipalities to fight
with airline corporations over the amount of leave allowed.
Dispute over Washington’s PSLA centered around this con-
cern.159 In addition to the risk presented by fatigue, the district
court in Washington also considered how the airline’s unforgiv-
ing time-off policies led to the increased spread of germs, as
“flight attendants have attested to working while sick to avoid
acquiring [demerits].”160 This led to “research show[ing] that
flight attendants’ interactions with passengers make them both
the most likely source and recipient of disease on flights.”161
And, in past attempts to alleviate this problem during the 2009
H1N1 “Swine flu” outbreak, the Association of Flight Attendants
(AFA) raised concerns with the FAA and the House Subcommit-
tee on Aviation that airline carriers should be required to “allow
flight attendants with flu-like symptoms themselves to call in sick
without risk of discipline.”162 The AFA turned to seeking federal
intervention due to its concern that “airline management [was]
more concerned with the appearance of flight attendants than
with the health of the public and the flight crew.”163 Without a
definite federal standard to guarantee labor protections for
workers, history has shown that airline carriers will sacrifice the
health of passengers and crew if it benefits their bottom line.
In Washington, though the airlines described being forced to
comply with the PSLA as an unreasonable burden, evidence
from when airlines were first subjected to New York City’s
Earned Sick Time Act (ESTA), which has similar provisions to
the Washington law, showed that “for the first two years after
Virgin began complying with ESTA, cabin crew delays only in-
creased by .16 percentage points, an amount that is almost irrel-
evant compared to the Airlines’ overall delay rates of 15 to 20
percent.”164 With empirics showing that the airlines’ argument
of the unreasonable burden to comply was without merit, the
159 Air Transp. Ass’n Am. v. Washington Dep’t Lab. & Indus., 410 F. Supp. 3d
1162, 1166 (W.D. Wash. 2019).
160 Id. at 1177.
161 Id.
162 Courtney Clegg, The Aviation Industry and the Transmission of Communicable
Disease: The Case of H1N1 Swine Influenza, 75 J. AIR L. & COM. 437, 460–61 (2010)
(citing Aviation Consumer Issues: Emergency Contingency Planning and Outlook for
Summer Travel: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transp.
and Infrastructure, 111th Cong. 22–24 (2009) (statement of Patricia A. Friend, In-
ternational President, AFA)).
163 Id. at 461.
164 Air Transp. Ass’n Am., 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1176.
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court in Washington held that airline workers were under the
protection of its PSLA.165 This same debate rages on in New
York City over the city’s ESTA, as both Delta166 and American
Airlines167 fight against complying with it.
Without federal intervention through legislation, airline carri-
ers have shown they will continue putting the health and safety
of crew, passengers, and people on the ground at risk. Airline
carriers will go to any measure to maximize profits at the cost of
safety with no hesitation. The FAA is primed to combat this type
of profit-over-safety mindset, and a congressional grant of au-
thority to amend Title 49 to include some sort of provision in
line with either Washington’s PSLA or New York’s ESTA would
end the debate over the amount of leave given to workers, in-
crease safety, decrease the spread of germs, and combat the is-
sue of pilot fatigue.
C. NAVIGATING THE MAZE: THE CURRENT THICKET OF
CONFUSING AND CONTRADICTING STATE AND LOCAL
LAW RESULTS IN NEEDLESS LITIGATION COSTS
The litigation in Bernstein is a quintessential example of litiga-
tion as deadweight loss—an economic term describing an ineffi-
cient allocation of resources that results in a cost to society as a
whole.168 That is to say, it is a needless waste of time, money, and
judicial economy. Embroiled in a multi-year class action wage
lawsuit with its former flight attendants for failure to pay for all
hours worked, overtime or provide accurate wage statements,
and waiting time penalties to discharged employees, Virgin Air-
lines (Virgin) continued to rack up costs as it (1) paid its own
legal fees; (2) was sanctioned to pay the legal fees of the class
action plaintiffs as a result of its misconduct in discovery;169 and,
ultimately, (3) paid approximately $77 million to members of
the class—nearly double from the starting amount of $45.4 mil-
165 Id. at 1177.
166 Linda Cheim, NYC Insists Paid Sick Leave Law Doesn’t Harm Delta, LAW360
(May 1, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1269513 [https://perma.cc/
K9NF-NGKZ].
167 Reenat Sinay, American Airlines Challenges NYC Paid Sick Leave Law, LAW360
(Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1184444/american-airlines-
challenges-nyc-paid-sick-leave-law [https://perma.cc/Z7WH-9KFQ].
168 Alicia Tuovila, Deadweight Loss, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 24, 2019), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/d/deadweightloss.asp [https://perma.cc/4D4V-
W9P5].
169 Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., No. 15-cv-02277-JST, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
201712, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2018).
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lion in damages and restitution for wage and hour violations as a
result of civil and statutory penalties.170 And while these costs
were mostly avoidable—namely, if Virgin had paid its employees
legally, or at the least complied in the discovery process—Virgin
ultimately will not be the party responsible for paying the fees,
as that cost gets passed on to society through increased costs to
consumers.
While it is certainly plausible that Virgin was genuinely mis-
taken as to the correct amount to pay its flight attendants who
worked in California as a result of the thicket of overlapping and
conflicting law discussed in Part III.B, that does not excuse the
bad faith dealing the business engaged in over the course of the
lawsuit. However, in a world with a clear, uniform, federally pre-
emptive statute instead of the hodgepodge of state regulations,
this lawsuit may have not existed at all. Virgin is far from the first
corporation embroiled in a suit like this, however—wage and
hour class action suits are an increasingly common tool for low
wage employees to fight back against predatory employers and
are by far the most common type of class action claim filed in
federal court.171 In 2017, employers paid out over $1.2 billion in
wage and hour lawsuits,172 and while Virgin’s $77 million judg-
ment may seem like a paltry amount in comparison to the total,
it represents nearly one-fifteenth of the total amount paid out by
all employers across the country that year.
Federally preemptive legislation can be used to stem the in-
creasing tide of wage and hour class action lawsuits. With a clear
and national uniform standard, employers are aware of the ex-
act amount that will be owed to each employee without having
to figure out the different wage and hour calculations for em-
ployees in each state. And, under a clear and uniform standard,
employees know exactly how much they should be earning, al-
lowing them to monitor their income for discrepancies and no-
tify their employer as soon as a discrepancy is noticed, thereby
alleviating the need for massive class-action lawsuits. Increased
information would only serve to benefit both parties, more effi-
170 Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 980, 985, 993 (N.D. Cal.
2019).
171 Daniel V. Dorris, Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of State Wage-and-Hour
Law Claims, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1251–52 (2009).
172 Wage and Hour Claims: 2018’s Top Litigation Risk For Employers, THATCHER L.
FIRM BLOG (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.thatcherlaw.com/blog/2018/02/wage-
and-hour-claims-2018s-top-litigation-risk-for-employers.shtml [https://perma.cc/
V2MR-X5PY].
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ciently putting wages back in the workers’ pockets to begin with,
saving employers money that would otherwise go to fighting
wage-and-hour class actions, and keeping price lower for con-
sumers as a result.
V. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO TITLE 49
This Comment proposes an amendment to Title 49, which
governs transportation laws, establishes the DoT,173 and is the
current source of the FAA’s authority.174 Given the FAA’s wide
control of all aspects of aviation safety, and the massive safety
implications of labor standards in the industry, as discussed in
Part IV.B, an amendment to Title 49 will solve the current gap
in the FAA’s coverage of safety regulations. Placing labor under
the ambit of Title 49 falls squarely within its policy goal of “as-
signing, maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as the
highest priorities in air commerce.”175 This Comment proposes
adding a new chapter to Title 49 (Transportation), Subtitle VII
(Aviation Programs), Subpart III (Safety). The following pro-
posed amendment is modeled after Washington’s PSLA,176 with
modifications made to align it with the language in Title 49.
Chapter 455—Paid Sick Leave (§§ 45501–45504)
§ 45501. Paid Sick Leave—Every air carrier177 must provide
each of its airmen178 or flight attendants179 paid sick leave as
follows:
173 49 U.S.C. §§ 101–727. Subtitle I of Title 49 establishes the DoT, its goals,
and its duties. Id.
174 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101–50105. Subtitle VII of Title 49 sets out regulations for
the aviation industry. Id.
175 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d)(1).
176 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.46.210 (West 2020).
177 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2) (defining “air carrier” as “a citizen of the United
States undertaking by any means, directly or indirectly, to provide air
transportation.”).
178 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(8). Title 49 defines “airman” as
an individual—
(A) in command, or as pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew,
who navigates aircraft when under way;
(B) except to the extent the Administrator of the Federal Avia-
tion Administration may provide otherwise for individuals
employed outside the United States, who is directly in
charge of inspecting, maintaining, overhauling, or repairing
aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; or
(C) who serves as an aircraft dispatcher or air traffic control-
tower operator.
Id.
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(a) An airman or flight attendant accrues at least one hour of
paid sick leave for every forty hours worked as an airman
or flight attendant. An air carrier may provide paid sick
leave in advance of accrual provided that such front-load-
ing meets or exceeds the requirements of this section for
accrual, use, and carryover of paid sick leave.
(b) An airman or flight attendant is authorized to use paid
sick leave for the following reasons:
(1) An absence resulting from an airman’s or flight at-
tendant’s mental or physical illness, injury, or health
condition; to accommodate the airman’s or flight at-
tendant’s need for medical diagnosis, care, or treat-
ment of a mental or physical illness, injury, or health
condition; or an airman’s or flight attendant’s need
for preventive medical care;
(2) To allow the airman or flight attendant to provide
care for a family member with a mental or physical
illness, injury, or health condition; care of a family
member who needs medical diagnosis, care, or treat-
ment of a mental or physical illness, injury, or health
condition; or care for a family member who needs
preventive medical care; and
(3) When the airman’s or flight attendant’s place of busi-
ness has been closed by order of a public official for
any health-related reason, or when an airman’s or
flight attendant’s child’s school or place of care has
been closed for such a reason.
(c) An airman or flight attendant is authorized to use paid
sick leave for absences as a result of domestic violence as
defined in Title 34 of the United States Code.180
179 9 U.S.C. § 44728(g) (defining “flight attendant” as “an individual working
as a flight attendant in the cabin of an aircraft that has twenty or more seats and
is being used by an air carrier to provide air transportation.”).
180 See 34 U.S.C. § 12291(a)(8).
The term “domestic violence” includes felony or misdemeanor
crimes of violence committed by a current or former spouse or inti-
mate partner of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares
a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has
cohabitated with the victim as a spouse or intimate partner, by a
person similarly situated to a spouse of the victim under the domes-
tic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction receiving grant mon-
ies, or by any other person against an adult or youth victim who is
protected from that person’s acts under the domestic or family vio-
lence laws of the jurisdiction.
Id.
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(d) An airman or flight attendant is entitled to use accrued
paid sick leave beginning on the ninetieth calendar day
after the commencement of his or her employment.
(e) Air carriers are not prevented from providing more gen-
erous paid sick leave policies or permitting use of paid
sick leave for additional purposes.
(f) An air carrier may require airmen or flight attendants to
give reasonable notice of an absence from work, so long
as such notice does not interfere with an airman or flight
attendant’s lawful use of paid sick leave.
(g) For absences exceeding three days, an air carrier may re-
quire verification that an airman or flight attendant’s use
of paid sick leave is for an authorized purpose. If an air
carrier requires verification, verification must be pro-
vided to the air carrier within a reasonable time period
during or after the leave. An air carrier’s requirements
for verification may not result in an unreasonable burden
or expense on the airman or flight attendant and may not
exceed privacy or verification requirements otherwise es-
tablished by law.
(h) An air carrier may not require, as a condition of an air-
man or flight attendant taking paid sick leave, that the
airman or flight attendant search for or find a replace-
ment worker to cover the hours during which the airman
or flight attendant is on paid sick leave.
(i) For each hour of paid sick leave used, an airman or flight
attendant must be paid the greater of the minimum
hourly wage rate established in this chapter or his or her
normal hourly compensation. The air carrier is responsi-
ble for providing regular notification to airmen or flight
attendants about the amount of paid sick leave available
to the airman or flight attendant.
(j) Unused paid sick leave carries over to the following year,
except that an air carrier is not required to allow an air-
man or flight attendant to carry over paid sick leave in
excess of forty hours.
(k) This section does not require an air carrier to provide fi-
nancial or other reimbursement for accrued and unused
paid sick leave to any airman or flight attendant upon the
airman or flight attendant’s termination, resignation, re-
tirement, or other separation from employment. When
there is a separation from employment and the airman or
flight attendant is rehired within twelve months of separa-
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tion by the same air carrier, whether at the same or a dif-
ferent business location of the air carrier, previously
accrued unused paid sick leave must be reinstated and
the previous period of employment must be counted for
purposes of determining the airman or flight attendant’s
eligibility to use paid sick leave under subsection
45501(d) of this section.
§ 45502. Family Member Defined—For purposes of this chapter,
“family member” means any of the following:
(a) A child, including a biological, adopted, or foster child,
stepchild, or a child to whom the airman or flight attend-
ant stands in loco parentis, is a legal guardian, or is a de
facto parent, regardless of age or dependency status;
(b) A biological, adoptive, de facto, or foster parent, steppar-
ent, or legal guardian of an airman or flight attendant or
the airman or flight attendant’s spouse or registered do-
mestic partner, or a person who stood in loco parentis
when the airman or flight attendant was a minor child;
(c) A spouse;
(d) A registered domestic partner;
(e) A grandparent;
(f) A grandchild; or
(g) A sibling.
§ 45503. Limitations on Policies—An air carrier may not
adopt or enforce any policy that counts the use of paid sick leave
time as an absence that may lead to or result in discipline
against the airman or flight attendant.
§ 45504. Air Carrier Retaliation—An air carrier may not dis-
criminate or retaliate against an airman or flight attendant for
his or her exercise of any rights under this chapter including the
use of paid sick leave.
VI. CONCLUSION
The lack of a clear and consistent federal standard across the
country harms both airline carriers and aviation employees—
carriers as they grapple with a myriad of regulations and airline
employees who are unsure of their rights and how to exercise
them. There is a clear need for an updated federal framework
that takes into account the airline industry and the needs of
workers in the present day; the RLA served its purpose in stabi-
lizing the nascent airline industry in the 1930s, but the aviation
industry has outgrown its usefulness. To replace the RLA and
2020] WHOSE RIGHTS ARE THEY ANYWAY? 569
standardize the labor rights of workers in the aviation industry,
this Comment proposes amending Title 49 to include a chapter
on labor. Because of the direct impact of the labor rights of air-
line workers on the safety of the aviation industry, legislation
dealing with these rights falls squarely within the purview of the
FAA. Through the proposed amendment, the aviation industry
will be made safer, workers will receive greater protections, and
the squandering of judicial economy through needless litigation
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